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Because California was a pioneer in the development of intrastate branching, we use its experience
during the 1920s and 1930s to assess the effects of the expansion of large-scale, branch-banking networks
on competition and the stability of banking systems. Using a new database of individual bank balance
sheets, income statements, and branch establishment, we examine the characteristics that made a bank
a more likely target of a takeover by a large branching network, how incumbent unit banks responded
to the entry of branch banks, and how branching networks affected the probability of survival of banks
during the Great Depression. We find no evidence that branching networks expanded by acquiring
"lemons"; rather those displaying characteristics of more profitable institutions were more likely targets
for acquisition. We show that incumbent, unit banks responded to increased competition from branch
banks by changing their operations in ways consistent with efforts to increase efficiency and profitability.
Results from survivorship analysis suggest that unit banks competing with branch bank networks,
especially with the Bank of America, were more likely to survive the Great Depression than unit banks
that did not face competition from branching networks. Our statistical findings thus support the hypothesis
that branch banking produces an externality in that it improves the stability of banking systems by
increasing competition and forcing incumbent banks to become more efficient.
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BRANCH BANKING AS A DEVICE FOR DISCIPLINE:  
COMPETITION AND BANK SURVIVORSHIP  




The deregulation of interstate branching in the United States, due to interstate 
agreements and the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 
1994, unleashed a flurry of bank mergers and acquisitions as banks sought to expand 
their scale and scope. The dramatic changes in the banking landscape have renewed 
interest in understanding how branch-banking networks affect competition among banks 
and the stability of the nation’s banking system (Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999) 
provide a detailed survey). Researchers have examined the characteristics that make 
banks targets for merger and acquisition as well as how such consolidation influences the 
behavior of competing banks. To a more limited extent, the literature has also explored 
how the wave of consolidation and the creation of larger banking networks affect 
systemic stability. Policymakers have recognized the importance of issues affecting 
financial stability, citing the large costs associated with instability.
1 Nonetheless, it is 
difficult to assess the long-run effect of branching networks on the stability of the U.S. 
banking system, especially on the viability of smaller banks, using data from a 
consolidation process that is still underway. Moreover, a problem of observational 
equivalence exists: the recent dearth of bank failures may simply be due to the fact that 
there have been no large macroeconomic shocks to test how the emerging interstate 
branch-banking system performs when it is stressed.
2  
The current wave of bank mergers in the U.S. is not without historical precedent. 
The 1920s were also a period of banking consolidation and rapid expansion in branching 
(Alston, Grove, and Wheelock 1994, Wheelock 1993, and White 1985). Most notably, 
branch banking expanded dramatically in California as large banks purchased numerous 
smaller banks to create branching networks. By 1929, 48 percent of the banks in 
                                                           
1 Hoggarth and Saporta (2001) suggest that the fiscal costs of banking crisis resolution have recently 
averaged 16% of GDP.  
2 According to NBER business cycle data, the most recent business cycle downturn was among the shortest 
and least severe in the postwar period.   2
California that existed in 1922 had been absorbed by other banks. This is comparable in 
scope to the recent period, during which 32 percent of the banks that existed in the United 
States in 1997 were purchased by other banks by 2004.
3 The expansion of branching in 
California was due largely to A.P. Giannini, founder of Bank of America, whose 
branching policies made California the unrivaled leader in the branch banking movement 
of the 1920s. As Bank of America’s branches blanketed the state, several other large 
banks were compelled to respond to Giannini’s competitive threat and set up their own 
branching networks. California’s branching networks thus developed more quickly and 
more extensively than those of any other state during this decade.  
Using a new historical data set containing information about earnings and balance 
sheets of individual commercial banks as well as bank mergers and branch establishment, 
we assess the effects of the expansion of branching in California on the competitive 
environment and on financial stability. This data set provides an excellent opportunity to 
examine these effects because we are able to follow developments at individual banks as 
they are exposed to competition, and which are then subjected to a large macroeconomic 
shock (the Great Depression). We first identify which characteristics of banks, and the 
communities in which they resided, made them attractive targets for acquisition. We then 
examine how banks responded to increased competition from the large branch-banking 
networks. Finally, we test how the expansion of branching affected the survivability of 
California banks during the Great Depression.  
Our study has several important implications for the literature on competition and 
stability in banking systems. As Allen and Gale (2004) have argued, it is not necessarily 
the case that there is a negative tradeoff between competition and financial stability. Our 
paper offers new empirical evidence on this issue.  We are able to monitor changes in the 
competitive environment for individual banks in the California banking system during the 
1920s and into the Great Depression. Our analysis of how changes in competition affect 
bank behavior and failure offers a unique test of how the removal of geographical 
restrictions on banking and the spread of branch banking affect financial stability.  
                                                           
3 In California, the acquired banks represented about 35 percent of the banking systems assets in the 1920s 
whereas those that were taken over more recently represented around 40 percent of the assets of the US 
banking system in 1997. The amount of consolidation during the recent period may be overstated as these 
figures include some consolidation within holding companies.   3
The paper also relates to the recent industrial organization literature on how the 
behavior of firms depends on the level of competition for customers. Looking at the 
cement industry, Syverson (2004) finds that barriers to substitution across producers can 
permit less productive or efficient plants or firms to survive, but as these barriers fall, 
“competition breeds efficiency.” Our data on California banks provides us with a detailed 
dynamic panel, which includes information on balance sheet and income statement data 
on individual firms as well as the level of competition. Using these data, we are able to 
assess whether changes in competition, induced by the expansion of branch banking, 
changed incumbent bank behavior. We are also able to compare our results to those of 
recent research analyzing the current wave of U.S. consolidation and branch bank 
expansion, which provides an interesting perspective on how consolidation, induced by 
branch banking, has affected bank competition during different periods. 
Finally, our analysis also sheds light on notable debates regarding the Great 
Depression. It has long been argued that the United States banking system was especially 
exposed to the shock of the Great Depression because of its unit-banking structure 
(Friedman and Schwartz 1963, Calomiris 2000). The empirical evidence on the effects of 
branch banking on financial stability, however, has presented somewhat of a puzzle. 
Studies using state- and county-level data find that states allowing branching had lower 
failure rates (Mitchener 2005, Wheelock 1995), while studies of individual banks find 
that branch banks were more likely to fail than other banks (Calomiris and Mason 2003, 
Carlson 2004). These findings suggest that the system-wide benefits of branching during 
the Depression most likely accrued as a result of something other than geographical 
diversification. In order to provide some resolution to this empirical puzzle, this study 
focuses on an alternative channel through which the expansion of branch banking in the 
1920s may have affected financial stability: competition. We utilize a dynamic panel data 
set to test how increased competition, induced by branch banking, affected bank 
survivorship during the Great Depression.  
In this paper, we find little evidence that branching networks expanded by 
purchasing “lemons.” Rather, we find evidence that branch banks avoided taking over 
banks with problem assets and find some evidence that banks with either more interest-
earning to total assets or more demand deposits to total deposits (balance sheet positions   4
consistent with higher profitability) were more likely to be acquired. These results are 
similar to those examining bank merger patterns in the recent period of industry 
consolidation.
4 We also find that large branch banking institutions tended to establish 
branches in large towns and in towns with higher ratios of banks per capita. 
Since our results suggest that weak banks were not pruned from the system by the 
expanding branching networks, the subsequent sections of the paper focus on whether 
unit banks, competing with branching networks, changed their behavior in response to 
increased competition and whether this, in turn, improved systemic stability. We find that 
banks that began competing with branch banks, especially with multiple branch 
networks, took measures to improve their profitability, likely in response to a change in 
the competitive environment. Unit banks shifted their portfolios away from other assets 
and towards loans, which typically earned higher returns. They also increased the share 
of demand deposits, relative to savings deposits, since these paid lower rates of interest to 
depositors. Further, we find that unit banks reduced administrative costs relative to other 
expenses. Changes in balance sheets and cost control measures appear to have been 
effective as the return on assets increased by a greater extent for unit banks that had to 
start competing with branching networks compared to banks where the competitive 
environment was little changed. These findings mirror those of studies examining recent 
bank behavior (such as Jayaratne and Strahan 1998 and DeYoung, Hasan, and Kirchhoff 
1998), which find that reductions in bank-entry restrictions eventually lead to increased 
efficiency. In particular, they are similar to Evanoff and Ors (2002), which also focuses 
on incumbent banks and finds improved efficiency in response to the removal of barriers 
to entry on banking. 
Perhaps our most interesting result relates to systemic stability. Estimates from 
survival analysis suggest that that unit banks located in cities or towns where large branch 
banks established offices were more likely to survive the Depression. Thus, we find that 
the same banks that became more efficient also became more financially stable. Our 
result appears especially relevant for very large branching networks, such as the Bank of 
America, which had the widest geographic scope and appeared to prompt the largest 
                                                           
4 Stiroh and Strahan (2003) suggest that banks entered markets by buying good banks and competing 
against poor performers.   5
changes in balance-sheet positioning, and also for competition from multiple branching 
networks. Giannini’s assault on local geographic monopolies appears to have transformed 
California’s banking system and produced an externality: unit banks improved their 
efficiency in ways that enabled them to better cope with the macroeconomic shock of the 
Great Depression.  
As there may be some concern that there is selection bias based on unobservable 
factors that leads to both the decision to establish a branch in a town and also improves 
survival, we conduct several robustness checks.  Using instrumental variable estimates, 
we find that the benefits from competition (in terms of increasing the survivability of unit 
banks) are robust to accounting for the possibility of selection bias in our econometric 
model. Since there can be problems with instrument choice, we also employ the 
methodology of Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005), and compute a measure of how large 
the bias due to selection on unobservable factors, as opposed to selection based on factors 
that we can observe and control for, would have to be in order to eliminate the impact of 
branching. We find that selection on unobservables would have to be between 2.1 and 2.9 
times stronger than selection on observables to explain away the entire branch banking 
effect, which seems highly unlikely.  
The existence of a competition externality is important for several reasons. First, 
it suggests that the banking system of the United States would have been less fragile in 
the 1930s had states allowed more branching, not necessarily because the branch banks 
would have been more diversified, but because the system would have consisted of more 
efficient banks. Second, it allows us to conjecture that, following the current shakeout, 
the wave of consolidation will improve the stability of the banking system for both large 
and small banks. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the rapid growth of branch 
banking in California in the 1920s. Section III presents an analysis of the factors that led 
to the establishment of branches in municipalities and made unit banks desirable targets 
for acquisition by branch banking networks. Section IV analyzes the external effect – 
changes in unit bank behavior in response to the entry of branch banks. Section V 
estimates the impact of branching on the stability of the banking system during the Great   6
Depression, considers whether the survivorship results are robust to selection bias, and 
provides an estimate of the degree of selection bias. Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Branch Banking in the 1920s 
 
A.  California’s leading role  
 
Although branching had occurred on an ad hoc basis in California for some time, 
the banking act of 1909 prescribed a formal process by which banks could establish 
branches throughout the state, subject to the approval of the state bank superintendent.
5 
The use of branching started slowly and then increased rapidly in the 1920s (Figure 1).
6 
Two decades later, on the eve of the Depression, branch-banking activity was more 
extensive in California than in any other state in the country (Table 1). The impact of 
branching was felt statewide: unlike some other well-branched states, like New York and 
Michigan, the majority of the branches were established outside the city of the bank’s 
parent institution or home office. By the end of the decade, California was the only state 
to have more branch offices than banks. California’s rapid expansion of branching piqued 
regulators’ interest in the 1920s, and fueled a debate over the merits of branch banking.
7  
California’s growth in branching relative to other states benefited from 
entrepreneurial talent and leadership as well as from an initially hospitable regulatory 
environment. State regulators saw it as their legal duty to enforce the banking act by 
defending the rights of any state bank interested in establishing branches. Moreover, an 
                                                           
5 Section 9 of the 1909 act stated that “No bank in this State…shall hereafter open or keep an office other 
than its principal place of business, without first having obtained the written approval of the superintendent 
of banks to the opening of such branch office, which written approval may be given or withheld in his 
discretion, and shall not be given by him until he has ascertained to his satisfaction that the public 
convenience and advantage will be promoted by the opening of such a branch office.” House of 
Representatives, (1930, Volume 2, Part 2, pp.1342).  
6 Since statewide branching was without precedent, Bank of America, the first to expand its branching 
network significantly, deemed it “prudent to ‘make haste slowly’,” and had only opened 23 branches by 
1919. House of Representatives, (1930, Volume 1, p.18). 
7 “This makes us interested in seeing how branch banking has actually been working under American 
conditions, and California is supposed to be the field of greatest experience thus far.” (House of 
Representatives 1930, Volume 2, Part 2, p.1342).   7
amendment to the act facilitated branching by enabling mergers to occur with no 
additional capital.
8  
Another feature that made California particularly ripe for the expansion of 
branching in the 1920s was its diversity of crops and industrial production. Unlike many 
Midwestern states, agricultural cycles were not coincident in timing in California. With 
harvests and plantings for various crops occurring at different times of the year, 
geographically-dispersed branching systems were well-suited to shifting funds from one 
area or region to another in order to maximize the utilization of existing bank capital.
9  
  
B. California’s large branch-bank networks 
 
  A.P. Giannini, founder of the Bank of America, was at the forefront of the 
California branching movement. Through purchase and de novo branch creation, he 
established the largest branching network in the state and the largest bank on the Pacific 
Coast by 1929.
10 Some competing branching networks began to emerge in 1921 when 
Giannini’s pioneering efforts to establish branches were adopted by other leading bankers 
in the state: Henry Robinson, P.E. Bowles, J.F. Sartori, and Edward Elliot. However, the 
branching network of the Bank of America was larger in scale than those of the other 
institutions (Table 2). More importantly, the scope of the Bank of America’s branching 
network was much broader, and covered almost the entire state (Figures 2-5). The next 
largest bank, Security-First National, expanded around Los Angeles and into the central 
valley, while the American Trust Bank and the California Bank were clustered around 
                                                           
8 Minimum capital requirements for banks with branches were higher than those without branches and each 
additional branch raised the required minimum. However, if a bank already had the minimum required 
amount of capital, no additional capital needed to be posted. In many cases, the absorbed unit bank’s 
capital, while it functioned as a unit bank, was higher than what was required to operate it as a branch. 
9 Some also argued that important agricultural centers like the San Joaquin and Imperial Valleys had 
seasonal demand for funds that exceeded what could be supplied by local banks. For a discussion of these 
points, see “Branch Banking is a Live Wire Subject,” Los Angeles Times, July 1, 1922, p.I7, “Branch 
Banking,” Los Angeles Times, December 4, 1922, p.I14, “California Bank Merger with $200,000,000 in 
Resources,” Wall Street Journal, July 3, 1922, p.4, and “Branch Banking in California,” Wall Street 
Journal, September 22, 1923, p.4. 
10 Giannini’s original bank was the Bank of Italy, founded in 1904. In the 1920s, he established other 
institutions, such as Bank of America and Liberty Bank. These were consolidated into Bank of America in 
1927, which was in turn part of the Transamerica holding company. For ease of exposition, we use the 
name Bank of America to refer to all Giannini institutions collectively unless it is necessary to refer to a 
specific one.   8
San Francisco and Los Angeles, respectively.
11 The willingness of the Bank of America 
to enter smaller towns can also be seen by looking at the distribution of its branches by 
town size (Table 3).  
  As the Bank of America was the only institution to establish a truly statewide 
presence, it may have had a more pervasive influence on the state’s banking environment. 
For example, the anecdotal evidence suggests that the expansion of the Bank of America 
significantly impacted the California banking system by introducing competition to 
localities that were previously geographic monopolies. James and James (1954) report 
that the Bank of America was able to offer lower loan rates than the smaller banks of the 
central valley. Bonadio (1994) indicates that the average rate of interest in towns would 
decline following the establishment of a Bank of America branch. 
 
C. Response of unit bankers 
 
The growth in branching was not without its opponents. Worried by the 
competitive threat of an expanding number of branching networks in the state, unit 
bankers formed the California League of Independent Bankers (CLIB) in 1922 as a 
lobbying organization aimed at the “preservation of unit banking.” Declaring branch 
banking the “menace of the hour,” they regularly canvassed the state legislature to 
abolish all non-home-office-city branches.
12 According to Bonadio (1994, p.86) nearly all 
of the state’s more than 500 independent bankers had joined this group by 1922, with 
league members taking vows to “never sell out to Giannini.” They argued that the growth 
of branch banking was leading to a monopoly of the moneyed interests: “Branch banking 
emanates from the minds of a few city bankers. It enables a few city men to control the 
banking assets of the state.”
13  
                                                           
11 The Security First-National and American Trust Bank were formed through the mergers of moderate-
sized branch networks during the 1920s. There were a few other banks with a modest number of branches; 
however, these branches were almost exclusively within the city of Los Angeles. 
12 The first two articles of association of CLIB stated, “We believe that branch banking is economically 
wrong, monopolistic in nature, and un-American in principle...We view with alarm the growth of branch 
banking in California as permitted under our present law.” (Chapin Hall, “Daily Trade Talk,” Los Angeles 
Times, November 28, 1922, p.I10. 
13 Quote of Carlos Hardy, Los Angeles attorney, appearing in Coast Banker, Nov. 1922, p. 501.   9
Although CLIB did not succeed in their ultimate goal, the state-banking 
department adopted several rulings aimed at limiting the growth in branching. Most 
notable was the “de novo rule,” which went into effect in 1921 under Superintendent 
Jonathan Dodge. It limited the establishment of a new branch outside the “principal place 
of business,” except by discretion of the state superintendent of banks.
14 This restricted 
Giannini’s plans for expansion of his San Francisco-based banks into the southern half of 
the state. Between 1923 and June 1925, the Superintendent issued 103 permits to Los 
Angeles banks for de novo banks in Los Angeles, but only one was granted to the Bank 
of Italy (headquartered in northern California), and this branch was already being 
processed when the ruling was announced. The de novo rule was favored by most of the 
southern California branch bankers, who wanted to keep Giannini’s network from 
expanding into the southern California market and competing head-to-head.
15 Bankers 
like Giannini thus pursued growth through an aggressive merger and acquisition strategy. 
Giannini began to use the Bancitaly Corporation (headquartered in Los Angeles) and a 
second, newly-formed bank holding company, Americommercial, to purchase Los 
Angeles-based banks and build a branching empire in Southern California.
16  
 
III. The Expansion of Branching 
 
A. Acquisition versus de novo expansion 
 
During the 1920s there was a massive consolidation of California banks through 
merger and acquisition. As noted earlier, roughly one-half of the banks in existence in 
1922 had been purchased or had merged with another bank by the end of 1929. 
Moreover, most of the expansion of branching networks outside the city of the bank’s 
                                                           
14 Another ruling was that no branch could be established outside the home-office city via consolidation or 
purchase unless both banks were at least three years old and the Superintendent found the branch to be for 
public convenience and advantage. 
15 See “Giannini Arouses Bankers,” Earle E. Crowe, Los Angeles Times, March 14, 1925, p.15.  
16 After two additional applications to establish branches were denied, the Bank of Italy filed suit in 1926 to 
overturn the “de novo rule,” arguing that the California Banking Act did not permit the superintendent of 
banking to restrict branch location (Westerfield, 1939). Although the rule was not changed, new personnel 
in the California banking department after the suit was filed enforced this rule less rigidly for the rest of the 
decade, and Bank of Italy (along with the related companies of Transamerica and Bank of America) was 
able to further expand in Southern California.   10
home office (typically San Francisco or Los Angeles) was done through acquisition 
(Table 4). The number of mergers was spread relatively evenly over time, although there 
was a spike in mergers during 1927. Acquisitions of banks by town size also tended to 
reflect the distribution of banks at the start of the period (Table 5). 
Legal restrictions on de novo branching played a significant role in pushing banks 
to expand through merger and acquisition. Even though these restrictions could 
sometimes be circumvented, there were reasons why banks may have preferred to expand 
through a strategy of merger and acquisition. First, it was cheaper (in terms of fixed 
costs) to acquire an existing facility than to build a branch from scratch. Second, by 
taking over an existing bank, the acquiring bank was able to draw on the managerial 
experience and long-term lending relationships of the existing bank. The Bank of 
America recognized these advantages and explicitly based its branch-expansion strategy 
on acquisition rather than establishing de novo branches. Giannini believed that rural 
communities would be more willing to accept an outside bank if it took over the 
operations of an existing bank. Explaining the strategy of Bank of America to Congress 
in 1930, James Bacigalupi, Vice Chairman of the holding company, stated:  
It was reasoned that the prudent way to enter an outside community was to 
purchase an established bank, because otherwise it could only be hoped, at 
the outset, to attract a few disgruntled depositors and before sufficient 
good business could be worked into, principally that which theretofore 
could find no accommodation there on account of the smaller capital and 
limited resources of the local banks, it would be years. Then, again, the 
bank would inevitably be confronted with the necessity of building a 
brand new local staff for the branch office – not the easiest thing in 
modern banking. Subsequent experience of the Bank of Italy demonstrated 
the soundness of this reasoning. By purchasing a good bank – and, almost 
without exception, such have been the banks which it has purchased – it 
acquired a staff, an advisory board, and local stockholders who were 




Bacigalupi further testified that Bank of America consistently established 
branches through the purchase of existing banks in every community it entered, with only 
one notable exception, Sacramento, where “it was found impossible to purchase a bank 
and, as result of popular petition, led by the chamber of commerce of that city, the then 
                                                           
17 House of Representatives (1930, Volume 2, Part 2, p.1341).   11
superintendent of banks granted Bank of Italy a permit to open a brand new office, a so-
called de novo branch.”
18 The Bank of America’s decision to purchase banks rather than 
create de novo branches and its policy of retaining the existing management to run the 
newly formed branch may have been aimed at ensuring better-quality local lending.
19 As 
Berger and Udell (2002) emphasize, small local banks may be inherently better at 
resolving agency problems associated with relationship lending. Relationship lending 
requires that banks gather information beyond what is readily available in financial 
statements of firms; such information is gathered through repeated contact with the firm 
and by observing its behavior on past loans and business with the bank. By employing the 
key executives of the former independent unit bank as branch managers and loan 
directors, Bank of America and other branching networks that pursued a similar strategy 
may have been attempting to reduce the oversight problems a large bank would otherwise 
face in relationship lending and better manage the “soft” data associated with the 
character and reliability of its borrowers.
20   
Banks were purchased either by acquiring their assets or by establishing holding 
companies that were organized with the explicit purpose of buying other banks.  Bank of 
America frequently employed the latter method and created the Stockholders Auxiliary 
Corporation (a holding company wholly owned by the shareholders of the bank) to 
acquire banks for its branching system.
21 
                                                           
18 House of Representatives (1930, Volume 2, Part 2, p.1341). 
19 For example, BankItaly Life (1921, volume 5, p.11), the magazine of the Bank of Italy, wrote, “In 
mapping out his campaign he [Giannini] determined to depart sharply in one particular area from foreign 
precedent. Instead of starting a new bank in any given community, he planned always to purchase a going 
concern – a bank that had won the reputation as a moneymaker and that enjoyed the confidence of the 
community. The most important change would be the change in name. He would retain all the old officers; 
and the former board of directors, augmented by new blood, would function as a local advisory board.”  
See also the comments by Giannini (House of Representatives 1930, Volume 2, Part 2, p.1544). 
20 For evidence that large banks typically face a disadvantage in relationship lending aimed at small, 
opaque firms, see Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise (1995). For evidence that non-Bank of America branching 
networks also retained management, see “New Bank Merger is Announced,” Los Angeles Times, March 11, 
1922, p.I13 and “Porterville Bank Merger Effective,” Los Angeles Times, January 5, 1924, p.16, and 
“California Bank Merger,” Wall Street Journal, September 11, 1926. 
21 The banking act of California did not permit banks to purchase the stock of another bank directly, but 
Section 31 permitted banks to purchase the assets of another bank. This was the method of direct 
consolidation employed by Bank of America and other branching networks in California. The bank holding 
company was a convenient corporate entity used to maneuver around regulatory restrictions on banking 
activities; for example, the Stockholders Auxiliary Corporation was used as an insurance agent and broker 
and to dispense of “problem” assets of banks (House of Representatives (1930, Volume 2, Part 2, p.1343).    12
As Table 4 further elucidates, the growth in branches outside the home-office city 
took place largely by purchasing existing banks. De novo branches were largely confined 
to the largest cities, especially San Francisco and Los Angeles, where the large branch 
networks already had substantial operations and merely expanded into areas where they 
recognized new business activities. Over two-thirds of the new branches in small towns 
were created through acquisition of an existing bank rather than by constructing new 
branch offices. Presented in a different way, Table 6 shows banks and mergers by year 
across locations that differed by the presence of large branching banks. Mergers were 
most common in cities where the large branch banks did not yet have offices, although 
these mergers often resulted in the establishment of a branch. (Hence, the remaining 
banks migrated to the columns in the table that display towns with branches). Our 
empirical research thus focuses on understanding the decisions related to bank acquisition 
rather than the establishment of de novo branches. 
 
B. Analysis of branch location decisions 
 
To understand which banks were more likely to be subjected to competition from 
branching networks, we first examine whether various city and county characteristics 
influenced the choice of where to establish new branches. All else equal, banks may have 
preferred communities where business opportunities, indicated here by city size and 
county income, were plentiful. With the boom in California agriculture during this 
period, banks may have sought out locations that would facilitate loans to farms and 
growing agri-businesses. Competition from other banks, as indicated by the number of 
financial institutions per capita and whether the town was served by only a single bank, 
may have affected expansion decisions. Proximity to a major city may have been 
preferred, as it would have facilitated contact with the bank’s headquarters, or banks may 
have sought to diversify their activities geographically by expanding away from the large 
cities. Finally, branch banks may have sought to locate in the southern part of the state   13
since this was the fastest growing region and the non-coincident nature of crop harvests 
(noted earlier as well suited to branch banking) was more pronounced.
22  
We test these hypotheses by looking at whether different city and county 
characteristics affected whether a bank was purchased and a branch established within a 
city during the period from June 30, 1922 to June 30, 1929.
23 (Since widespread networks 
did not emerge until 1921 for banks other than the Bank of America, we use 1922 as the 
departure date for this study.) We separately consider: (1) whether the Bank of America 
bought a bank in the town; (2) whether a large branching network other than the Bank of 
America bought a bank (those shown in Figures 3-5); and (3) whether a small branch 
bank network (defined as any other branching network) bought a bank. Since the decision 
to buy a bank has only two outcomes, we use logistic analysis.  
Data on mergers and branch location were primarily collected from Comptroller 
of Currency Annual Report and Statements of Conditions and the Annual Report of the 
Superintendent of Banks of the State of California; however, we supplemented this 
information with data from Rand McNally (various years) as well as with internal records 
from the Bank of America’s archives. All cities that were incorporated as of 1920 and 
had population information reported in the 1920 Census were included in the analysis. 
Data on city attributes, such as size and county seat status, were collected from Rand 
McNally (1922), U.S. Department of Commerce (1920), and California State Department 
of Finance (2004). Proximity to a major metropolitan area (Los Angeles or San 
Francisco) was collected using “as the crow flies” distances based on programming and 
data from the U.S. Geological Survey.
24 Other county characteristics (such as population, 
income, industry mix) are from U.S. Department of Commerce (1910, 1920). We use the 
June 29, 1922 values of the city banking variables. All other city and county 
characteristics, with the exception of the population growth rate, are 1920 values. For 
municipality m, we estimate the following equation: 
                                                           
22 See Chapin Hall, “Business, Financial Markets, Investment – Daily trade talk,” Los Angeles Times, 
August 5, 1922, p.I6. 
23 We exclude cities in which a branch existed before June 30, 1922, since different factors may have 
mattered. Alternatively, we examined the time until the branch bank established a branch in the town either 
through purchase or by establishing a de novo branch. Results (not reported) were nearly identical. 
Regressions using duration analysis yielded comparable results. 
24 We use information from http://www.indo.com/distance/, which is based on the “geod” program – a part 
of the “PROJ” system available from the U.S. Geological Survey.   14
 
(1) Whether a bank is purchasedm = f{ β1 Banking institutions per capitam + β2 One banking institutionm 
β3 National bank in citym + β4 Log  populationm + β5 Distance to nearest large citym +  
β6 Distance to nearest large city squaredm  + β7 County seatm +  
β8 Share of county income from agriculturem + β9 County income per capitam +  
β10 Share county population that are immigrantsm +  
β11 County population growth rate( 1910-1920) m + β12 County in the Northern part of the statem }. 
 
As Table 7 shows, we find that larger municipalities were more desirable 
locations, possibly because these offered more business opportunities.
25 (Larger cities 
were preferred even if we restrict the sample to cities with less than 20,000 people.) 
Municipalities with more banks per capita were also attractive places to buy banks and 
establish branches, while those with only one bank were less attractive. Distance from the 
major population centers appears to have played little role in location decisions made by 
the Bank of America. For other large branch banking networks, distance and distance 
squared have opposite signs, indicating that distance deterred acquisition but that the 
effect diminished further out (with the effects canceling at about the distance between 
Los Angeles and Fresno). Consistent with statements from contemporaneous trade 
publications (and Figures  3-5), large branching networks, other than the Bank of 
America, branched more in the southern part of the state.
26 Somewhat surprisingly, fast-
growing counties (measured by population change) do not seem to have been particularly 
successful at attracting branch banks. Small branch banking networks appear to have 
been the only type of bank to show a propensity to buy banks in faster growing 
communities. 
 
                                                           
25 Regression coefficients can be transformed so that the value 100*(exp(β) - 1) indicates the percentage 
change in the probability of an event for each one-unit increase in the independent variable. For example, 
the regression coefficient on town banking institutions per capita, which has a value of 0.12, implies that a 
one-unit increase in this independent variable increases the likelihood of the event by 13 percent. Note that 
negatively-signed coefficients indicate a reduction in the likelihood of an event. 
26 The Coast Banker, February 1925, p.202, suggests that branch banks in Los Angeles were purchasing 
banks in order to further “consolidate the banking resources of large institutions in Los Angeles with those 
of outlying communities in Southern California.” And  the Los Angeles times reported in 1922 that branch 
bank expansion was now “at a flood tide,” with seventeen new branches being added by Los Angeles Trust 
& Savings Bank, Citizens Trust and Savings Bank, and Security Trust and Savings Bank (“Extension of 
Branch Bank Idea,” Los Angeles Times, May 7, 1922, p.I12.)    15
C. Analysis of bank characteristics 
  
We also examine which characteristics of banks made them more or less attractive 
for acquisition by branching networks. We explore this issue in some depth because it 
helps distinguish between competing hypotheses concerning how competition might have 
influenced systemic stability. That is, branch banking networks, on average, may have 
purchased high-performing banks, average banks, or "lemons" in the 1920s. If they 
purchased lemons, this might indicate that banking stability improved in California 
because weak banks were removed from the system (assuming the weak banks could be 
absorbed without indigestion by the branching networks). On the other hand, if branch 
banking networks purchased average or high-performing banks, then a theory about why 
competition from branch banks improved stability would instead need to focus on the 
behavior of the remaining unit banks that competed head-to-head with the branching 
networks. For example, the introduction of branches into local markets might have 
induced changes in the performance or behavior of the incumbent, unit banks. We 
therefore pay particular attention to bank characteristics to see if branch banking systems 
acquired lemons. If they did not, then we will proceed by considering the effects that 
competition, induced by branch banking, had on the remaining unit banks. 
We collected balance sheet data on all California commercial banks in 1922, 
1924, and 1926 using information for National banks contained in the Comptroller of 
Currency Annual Report and Statements of Conditions and information on state banks 
from the Annual Report of the Superintendent of Banks of the State of California. (State 
banks constitute roughly half our sample of banks.) We also collected income and 
expense data for Federal Reserve member banks from the Treasury Department and 
Federal Reserve Reports of Earnings, Expenses, and Dividends for 1922 and 1926. There 
are trade-offs to using income as opposed to balance sheet data. The income data allow us 
to get at profitability directly, but it is available for a more limited sample of banks. We 
thus conduct separate analyses using these two data sets. In general, the data are similar 
to those used in other studies examining bank failures in the 1930s (Calomiris and Mason 
2003, Carlson 2004).    16
From the sources listed above and the Bank of America’s archives, we also 
gathered data on all changes in the competitive environment for California banks between 
1922 and 1933 – bank openings, mergers, acquisitions, de novo branches, voluntary 
liquidations, and bank failures. These data enable us to examine the effects of branching 
in towns, cities, counties, and across the state, and to draw inferences on how its growth 
reshaped the competitive landscape and the stability of California banks during the Great 
Depression.  
  To analyze acquisitions by branch banks, we focus on the balance-sheet and 
income ratios that affect the profitability, soundness, and liquidity of banks. However, we 
also include a variety of other attributes that might affect whether a bank was a desirable 
target for acquisition. These other variables are the age of the bank (as older banks might 
be more loathe to give up an established reputation or may have developed better 
relationship-banking skills), the bank’s charter status (which might affect the ease of 
regulatory approval), and whether the bank operates a trust department.
27 We also include 
some of the geographical factors that we found to have mattered in regressions on the 
decision of where to locate a new branch. (Summary statistics are provided in Appendix 
Table 1.) 
  To fully utilize information about the order banks were acquired, we use duration 
analysis. This framework also allows us to update banks’ balance sheet information in 
1924 and 1926, earnings information in 1926, and changes in the competitive 
environment of the town as they occur. Our estimation procedure parallels recent work 
analyzing the factors that contributed to the failure of banks during the Depression 
(Calomiris and Mason 2003, Carlson 2004), which also uses duration analysis. 
 
i. Analysis using balance sheet data 
 
                                                           
27 There were regulatory differences that affected the attributes of the banks beyond what is immediately 
obvious from the top line balance sheet numbers.  For instance, California’s banking law was also 
relatively unique in that it required state banks to completely segregate commercial, savings, and trust 
departments. State bankers aggressively advertised this difference in organizational structure in an attempt 
to gain a competitive advantage over national banks in the state and attract more deposits. They publicized 
the idea that savings depositors would be safer in their banking system if runs occurred because they would 
not have to line up alongside commercial depositors to withdraw their deposited funds. Consequently,   17
All else equal, one might expect acquiring banks to prefer to take over sound and 
profitable banks. However, some historians writing on California’s consolidation in the 
1920s (Bonadio 1994) have suggested that regulators may have encouraged the large 
branch networks to take over failing banks. We initially examine which hypothesis is 
correct by using balance sheet data, which are available for all commercial banks in the 
state of California and which provide information about capital adequacy, liquidity, and, 
indirectly, about profitability. To examine the soundness of the bank, we examine the 
capital-asset and surplus-asset ratios as well as measures of excess capital and excess 
surplus.
28 Our measure of the liquidity of the bank is the cash-to-deposit ratio. The ratios 
we use that are indicative of bank profitability are interest-earning assets to total assets 
(suggestive of earnings potential) and demand deposits to total deposits (reflecting cost 
structure). Thus, for bank i, we estimate the equation: 
 
(2) Time until mergeri = f{ β1Log assetsit + β2Interest bearing assets to total assetsit +  
β3Capital to assetsit + β4Surplus to assetsit + β5Excess capital ratioit + β6Excess surplus ratioit +  
β7Cash to depositsit + β8Demand deposits to total depositsit + β9State bank indicatorit +  
β10Log age of bankit + β11Trust Departmentit + β12Log town populationi +  
β13One bank in townit + β14Banks in town per capitait },  
 
where t denotes an independent variable that changes over time. We estimate equation (2) 
using three different definitions of the dependent variable: (1) the time until the Bank of 
America acquired a bank, (2) the time until a large branching network other than the 
Bank of America acquired a bank, and (3) the time until a small branching network made 
an acquisition. These events, in the duration framework, are defined as bank acquisitions 
that took place between June 30, 1922 and June 30, 1929.
29 Balance sheet and banks 
                                                                                                                                                                             
California had a higher percentage of savings deposits relative to total deposits than the nation as a whole: 
64% versus 44% in 1925 (Westerfield, 1939). 
28 Excess capital is capital held by the bank beyond what it is legally required to hold. Surplus reflects 
retained earnings held at the bank. Excess surplus is therefore the amount of the bank’s surplus fund 
exceeding the legal requirement. We compute measures that are the excess of capital or surplus as a share 
of the total capital or surplus. 
29 In the estimation, we assume a log-logistic distribution. With this distribution, the hazard rate is zero 
when t equals zero, rises to a peak over the sample period, then declines back to zero as t goes toward 
infinity. Likelihood ratio tests suggest that this distribution provides the best fit. Similar tests are used to 
determine the best distribution each time duration analysis is used.   18
characteristics are updated from their 1922 values in 1924 and 1926. Town characteristics 
are updated as they change. 
Table 8 indicates several factors were important in determining which banks were 
targeted for acquisition during the 1920s. (In reporting our coefficients, a negative sign 
indicates that an increase in the independent variable is associated with reduced time until 
merger and is thus a more desirable bank attribute).
30 First, the results show that Bank of 
America (column 1) preferred to take over banks with more interest-earning assets as a 
share of total assets. A one percentage-point increase in this measure (one-tenth of a 
standard deviation) would decrease the expected time until the bank was purchased by 
1.7 percent. This finding is consistent with the notion that more profitable banks were 
preferred targets of acquisition, since interest income is one of the principal sources of 
bank income. The Bank of America also tended to purchase banks with higher capital-
asset ratios, which is consistent with a preference for acquiring more solvent banks. 
Large branching networks, other than the Bank of America, appear to have sought banks 
with a lower cost structure (and thus potentially more profitable banks) as suggested by 
the coefficient on the ratio of demand deposits to total deposits displayed in column 2. 
The importance of a bank’s capital position for other large branching networks is more 
difficult to ascertain as the higher surplus-asset ratios made the bank less attractive, while 
higher ratios of surplus beyond the legal requirements appear to have been more 
attractive. All large branching networks appear to have been more interested in taking 
over state banks. Smaller branching networks avoided taking over unit banks with higher 
shares of interest earning assets, but did purchase banks with higher capital ratios. 
 
ii. Analysis using earnings data 
 
Using income and earnings data, we are able to directly measure profitability and 
asset quality, but are limited to the smaller sample of Federal Reserve member banks. 
                                                           
30 In our tables using duration analysis, the reported coefficients can be transformed to indicate the 
percentage change in the expected time until the even occurs for each one-unit increase in the independent 
variable. For a given coefficient β, the transformed value is 100*(exp(β) - 1). Thus, the regression 
coefficient for interest-bearing assets to total assets, which has a value of -0.017, can be transformed to 1.7, 
which shows that a one-unit decrease in this ratio increases the expected time until the event occurs by a bit 
less than 2 percent.   19
Indicators of profitability are the return on equity, which is defined as the ratio of net 
earnings after accounting for net loan losses (loan losses minus recoveries) to capital, and 
the ratio of administrative costs to total expenses. Asset quality is measured by net losses 
on assets – the ratio of net loan losses to assets. We also include a few additional balance 
sheet items in the analysis. Here, for each bank i, we estimate the equation: 
 
(3) Time until mergeri = f{ β1Log assetsit + β2Net worth to assetsit + β3Cash to depositsit +  
β4Demand to total depositsit + β5Return on equityit + β6Net losses on assetsit +  
+ β7Administrative costs to total expensessit + β8State bank indicatorit +  
Β9Log age of bankit + β10Trust departmentit + β11Log town populationi +  
Β12One bank in townit + β13Banks in town per capitait }, 
  
where t denotes an independent variable that changes over time. Given the smaller 
number of mergers in the Fed member sample of banks, we estimate equation (3) only for 
the time until the bank is taken over by one of the four large branch banking networks. As 
in the balance sheet regressions, the events in the duration framework are defined as bank 
acquisitions that took place between June 30, 1922 and June 30, 1929. Balance sheet, 
earnings data, and banks characteristics are updated from their 1922 values in 1926. 
Town characteristics are updated as they change. 
  Table 9 shows how measures of earnings and asset quality affect the decision to 
acquire a bank. Banks with a higher return on equity were taken over later than other 
banks, with a one percentage point increase in the return on equity (one-eighth of a 
standard deviation) increased the expected time until the bank is purchased by 2 percent.  
Higher net losses on assets also increased the time until the bank was purchased with a 
one-percentage point increase in this measure (two standard deviations) delaying the 
expected time until acquisition by 32 percent. Hence, for the income statement data of the 
more limited sample of Federal Reserve member banks, the results suggest that the large 
branch banking networks tended to buy middle of the road banks—that is they did not 
take over banks with exceptionally strong performances nor did they take over banks 
where there were notable asset problems.  
 
   20
iii. Discussion 
 
  In general, we find no evidence that large branching networks preferred to take 
over poorly performing banks.
31 That they may have preferred to avoid taking over banks 
that displayed financial weakness is not surprising since these would be the most difficult 
banks to digest or absorb into an existing network of branches. Our findings are not 
inconsistent with the conclusions of contemporaneous policymakers and analysts 
examining California’s experience. As Ostrolenk (1930, p.177) explained, “Branch bank 
organizations, however, sought for purchase mostly stronger banks, nor were they so 
improvident of the welfare of their own depositors as to incorporate into their own totals 
the slow loans and forfeited real estate of the selling institutions.” In its examination of 
branching in the 1920s, the Federal Reserve concluded that, “There is, of course, every 
reason to believe that the great majority of the unit banks absorbed by the branch 
operating banks of California were in sound condition when taken over. Those in 
financial difficulty were undoubtedly the exception rather than the rule (1931, Vol. 8, 
p.103).” Although newspaper accounts often played on the drama of taking over troubled 
banks during the 1920s (for example, Bank of Italy and Pacific Southwest Trust and 
Saving’s bank purchase of troubled Valley Bank of Fresno), there are nevertheless just as 
many accounts from the period suggesting that, in general, branching networks preferred 
strong banks.
32  
  Our findings regarding the takeover behavior of expanding banks during the 
1920s are similar to those of studies of more recent times. In particular, our results are not 
inconsistent with those of Stiroh and Strahan (2003), which find that banks enter markets 
by buying good banks. Since we do not find evidence that the stability of the system 
allowing branch banking was improved through the removal of weak banks, we now turn 
to examining the effects of branching on the remaining, rival unit banks.  
                                                           
31 Although the sample is much smaller (49 bank purchases), we also examined whether a different pattern 
was observed for acquisitions occurring during the Great Depression. The only balance sheet characteristic 
that mattered for 1929-33 was the capital-asset ratio; higher values reduced the time it took to be acquired. 
32 For example, when the Bank of America entered the Imperial Valley, the Los Angeles Times reported 
that its first acquisition was the First Bank of El Centro, “one of the strongest financial institutions in the 
rapidly developing Imperial Valley.” (“Business News of Busy Marts,” Los Angeles Times, February 25, 
1923, p.II10). When moving into Kern county, the bank acquired “one of the substantial institutions of San 
Joaquin Valley.” (“Bank of Italy Invades Kern,” Los Angeles Times, August 26, 1921, p.I18)    21
 
IV. Changes in Bank Behavior Resulting from Consolidation  
 
We first examine how incumbent banks reacted to the change in the competitive 
environment in local banking markets – an issue that has been of interest to economists 
analyzing the recent transformation of the U.S. banking industry and those examining 
how banking markets in developing countries are affected by foreign bank entry.
33 In 
particular, we examine whether banks in towns where a branch was established changed 
their behavior in response to the fact that they now faced competition from a branch-
banking institution – what is often called the external-market effect. The banking 
literature suggests that the dynamics of banking ought to change with the introduction of 
branching as it increases competition and breaks down local monopolies. The increase in 
competition generated by branching networks occurs over both quantity (customers) and 
price: a bank with many branches offers a bundle of services to its customers, including 
different types of accounts, different lending products, and additional services. The 
remaining unit banks may respond by changing their behavior and improving the 
efficiency of their operations. 
Branching networks had a number of advantages that allowed them to compete on 
price and offer loans at lower rates than existing unit banks. As noted earlier, branch 
banking networks in California generally combined the advantages of small banks 
(retaining local management and maintaining lending relationships) with the scale 
economies of larger banks (additional expertise from the central office, standardization of 
accounting and auditing methods, and reduced overhead costs). Further, branch networks 
could shift deposits between branches to take advantage of favorable lending 
opportunities. 
Newspaper accounts from the period indicate that large branching institutions, 
especially the Bank of America, actively competed on price by offering lower loan rates 
than competing unit banks; Giannini argued that he had reduced loan rates in small towns 
                                                           
33 In this section, our approach is similar to Evanoff and Ors (2002) in that we focus on how entry affects 
the behavior of incumbent banks rather than the condition of the acquiring bank. For literature on how 
incumbents in developing countries responded to foreign competition see, for example, Claessens, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga (2001), Denizer (2000), and Martinez, Soledad, and Mody (2004).   22
to 7 percent, which was anywhere from two to five percentage points lower than what 
had previously prevailed.
34  James and James (1954) provide specific examples of 
agricultural communities in the San Joaquin Valley where Giannini lowered interest 
rates. Analysts writing in the 1920s also argued that entry by branching networks reduced 
rates. Preston (1922) stated that, in California, the “immediate effect of the establishment 
of branch has been to reduce interest rates for the better class of loans.” Somewhat more 
recently, Martin (1952) has suggested that, in addition to lowering interest rates on loans, 
the Bank of America paid higher rates of interest to depositors. These practices are 
similar to recent bank behavior as noted by Berger, Rosen, and Udell (2001), which finds 
lower loan rates in markets dominated by large banks.  
Branching networks also competed on quantity. The legal limits of the 1920s, 
which were based on capital and surplus, likely restricted the ability of smaller banks to 
lend to larger customers. All else equal, since branched banks were generally much larger 
in size than unit banks, they could move into a location and capture the business of large 
customers who may have otherwise gone to a bank outside of the municipality to borrow. 
This advantage was well known by regulators and bankers during the period.
35 Finally, 
branch banks also carried out campaigns to lure depositors from other institution; one 
way of luring customers was by offering additional products, such as selling securities 
and trust services, which smaller banks did not necessarily provide.
36  
 
A. Estimates of an External Market Effect 
 
Competition over price, quantity, and products may have elicited rival firms to 
change their management or organizational practices, reduce costs, increase revenues, or 
improve their product mix in response to the presence of branching networks. We analyze 
                                                           
34 House of Representatives (1930, Volume 2, Part 2, pp.1547, 1556). See also “Future Fields of Branch 
Banking,” Coast Banker, February 1924, p.153.  
35 For example, see the comments of Will C. Wood, Superintendent of California State Banking, Coast 
Banker, August 20, 1927, “Mr. Wood Analyzes McFadden Act” and comments and data from James 
Balcigalupi’s testimony to the House of Representatives (1930, Volume 2, Part 2, p.1392). 
36 Bankers from the 1920s referred to the additional services a parent institution could provide through its 
branch banks as “equipment services.” These included the purchase and sale of exchange, bonds and 
commercial paper, acceptances, credit departments, letters of credit, collection of drafts, and research and 
specialists for advising on real estate and commodity markets. See John E. Barber, “Branch Banking in 
California,” Los Angeles Times, October 5, 1922, p.IV7.    23
the external effects of consolidation and branch expansion by testing whether various 
balance sheet ratios and earnings measures changed more between 1922 and 1929 for 
banks that began competing with branch banks than for banks that either did not face 
such competition or that already faced it at the beginning of the sample period (and thus 
had already altered their behavior).
37 We control for the initial characteristics of the unit 
banks (as of 1922), city and county characteristics (such as the population growth rate 
over the period, the share of 1920 county income in agriculture, and distance from a large 
city), and changes in the banking environment in the city (including whether there was 
any unit bank entry between 1922 and 1929). We examine the effects of competing with 
the Bank of America, other large branch bank networks, and small branch banks. For 
non-branching bank i, we estimate the following equation using ordinary least squares: 
 
(4) Change in the balance sheet or income measurei =  
f{ β1-3 Indicators of changes in competition from branchingi + β4 New unit bank enters towni 
  β5 State banki + β6 Log age of banki + β7 Trust departmenti +  
β8 Population growth rate in town 1922-1929i + β9 Distance to large cityi +  
β10 Distance to large city squaredi + β11 Share of county income from agriculturei }. 
 
  When analyzing changes in balance sheet variables for incumbent banks, we use 
two specifications of the indicators that capture competition from branch banking. The 
first includes indicators for whether the Bank of America, the other three large branching 
networks, and small branching banks established branches; the second specification uses 
indicators of whether the bank started to compete with one large branch bank or with 
multiple large branch banks. The results of the regressions (shown respectively in Tables 
10 and 11) present some evidence that incumbent banks, which faced new competition 
from branch banks, made changes that were consistent with efforts to increase their 
profitability. In several specifications, we find that banks competing with large branch 
banking networks increased loans relative to assets more than those not facing branching 
competition (loans typically earned a higher rate of return than other assets). This change 
may not be surprising if the interest rate banks were able to charge on loans decreased 
following the entrance of a branch bank, as reported in contemporary accounts from the 
                                                           
37 We thank Charles Calomiris and Joseph Mason for providing profit data for 1929.   24
1920s. To support their earnings, banks might have responded by rebalancing their 
portfolios to increase loans. (Another possible explanation is that the growth in loans at 
banks starting to face competition from large branch banks occurred as the remaining unit 
banks hired former loan officers of purchased banks. However, as we indicated earlier, 
historical evidence from the period indicates that the large branching networks were 
adept at maintaining the management of banks they purchased in order to continue 
lending relationships.
38) Our analysis suggests that the increase in loans occurred as 
securities as a share of assets declined. Since the growth rate of interest-earning assets 
does not appear to have been significantly affected by changes in competition, the 
increase in loans and decrease in securities appear to be consistent with a rebalancing of 
unit-bank portfolios. We also find that banks entering into competition with multiple 
large, branch-banking networks (or the Bank of America) increased the share of demand 
deposits relative to total deposits. Demand deposits were generally lower cost deposits 
(Secrist 1930), so this further change in behavior is also consistent with efforts to 
increase efficiency and profitability. (These position changes also increase the potential 
loss and liquidity risks to the bank, so the impact on survival is unclear.)  
   When analyzing changes in earnings ratios for incumbent banks, the branching 
variable we use is whether the bank started to compete with any of the four large branch 
banks (i.e., the bank went from not competing with any of the four large branch banks to 
                                                           
38 We verified this by examining detailed records of Security Trust and Savings Bank and the Bank of 
America reported in the Annual Reports of the Superintendent of Banks of California, the Federal Reserve 
Reports of Condition (call reports) and court documents (United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit No. 10768 Transamerica Corporation v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 1952, 
Volume 10, Board Exhibit 27). These documents provided information on whether management was 
retained at banks purchased between the years 1922-1926. Security Trust and Savings Bank, which also 
provided information on advisory board participation, had an extremely high retention rate; it retained key 
management (officers or directors) of the formerly independent unit bank to run branches or serve on the 
advisory board of the newly created branch office in 85 percent of the banks it acquired. For Bank of 
America, we can only examine whether management was retained to actively run the bank rather than serve 
on the advisory board. Even in this more limited capacity, we find that roughly 25 percent of Bank of 
America’s bank purchases during this period employed former key management as either branch managers 
or vice presidents of the branch. Additional officers of the purchased bank were often transferred within the 
larger Bank of America organization to achieve cost savings at the bank while retaining local expertise 
(Martin, 1952, p.184). On the other hand, according to calculations based on data from the Annual Reports 
of the Superintendent of Banks of California of 1922-28, unit banks competing with these newly opened 
branches were much less successful at luring away the management of formerly independent banks. Only 
11 percent of rival unit banks succeeded in hiring the former management of an independent bank located 
in their town in the three years following the purchase of a unit bank by one of the branching networks. 
(This calculation excludes those bank purchased in the very largest California cities.)   25
competing with at least one of them).
39 As Table 12 shows, banks facing new competition 
from one of the four large, branch-banking networks had greater declines in 
administrative costs relative to expense than other banks. This finding is consistent with 
efforts to increase efficiency. Further, we look at profitability directly by examining the 
return on equity and on assets.
40 While we do not find a statistically significant impact for 
return on equity, we do find a positive effect on banks’ return on assets, which provides 
some evidence that profitability increased more at banks that began competing with a 
large branching network than at banks which did not face such competition. (Comparing 
the average changes for the groups—not shown in tables—the return on assets fell 28 
basis points at banks where the level of competition was unchanged, but rose slightly at 
banks where competition increased.) 
 
B. Accounting for Selection Bias 
 
  It is possible that branching networks only chose to expand into areas or towns 
that were more stable or profitable. If this were the case, we would be attributing the 
changes in balance sheets to changes induced by competition rather than the branching 
network’s ability to enter markets in a selective fashion.  
The historical record suggests that branch-banking systems were not particularly 
selective with respect to location. For example, Giannini commented in 1927 that he 
wanted a truly comprehensive branching network, and “he set himself the goal of having 
at least one of his branches in every California town” (Nash, 1992, p.72). According to 
the official biographers of Bank of America, to fulfill this goal, Giannini pushed his 
branching empire into “the remote high country of California – the timberlands, the cattle 
domains, the fishing and hunting areas, the mining centers” (James and James, 1954, 
p.225). They describe his efforts to establish branches in the remote mountain regions of 
the state, including at the base of Mt. Shasta in Dunsmuir and in the Sierras, as well as in 
desert communities, such as Owens Valley, which had been left without a bank after a 
prominent bank failure (James and James, 1954, p.226-8). Giannini’s goal of blanketing 
                                                           
39 We are not able to use more disaggregated measures due to the reduced sample size.  
40 Return on assets is the ratio of net earnings after accounting for net loan losses to assets.   26
the state with branches is also reflected by the extent of his branching empire as of 1929, 
as shown in Figure 2. 
  In addition to evidence from the historical record, we also address the issue of 
selection bias with instrumental variables (IV) regressions. Tables 13 and 14 report the 
first-stage results and IV estimates when the external effect on unit banks is considered 
for balance sheet characteristics (as in Table 10). For our instrumental variables, we 
employ characteristics of towns or cities that are correlated with the branch location 
decision of the four large branch bank networks, but unlikely to be correlated with the 
changes in unit bank balance sheets. These include the town or city’s population in 1922, 
whether it is city in north of state, the county’s population in 1910, and an interaction 
variable of city population and the north of state indicator.
41 As shown in Table 14, the 
reported coefficients on the branching variables (defined as at least one large branch 
banking network in the town) do not appear sensitive to controlling for selection bias; the 
results are similar to what we reported in Table 10. The coefficient on branching is 
statistically significant and positive when the dependent variable is the loan to assets ratio 
and statistically significant and negative when the dependent variable is the securities to 
assets ratio. Similar results to those presented in Table 11 are found when we examined 
the profitability measures (not reported). 
Thus, our analysis using balance sheet characteristics and profitability measures 
provides a consistent story, and mirrors reports from contemporaries that banks took 
steps to increase profitability in response to competition from branch networks. The 
Coast Banker, a newspaper covering banking on the Pacific Coast, reported that:  
Cooperation is strengthening the independent banks in their competition 
with chain and branch banking systems was the view expressed by T.C. 
Scroggs, vice president, National Bank of Commerce, Los 
Angeles…speakers stressed the point that the rivalry between the two 
systems was resulting in more efficient management of independent banks 
(Vol. 44, Feb 20, 1930, p.97). 
                                                           
41 Overidentification tests from the first-stage regressions based suggest that the instruments are orthogonal 
to the dependent variable; the p values for Sargan’s test statistic for the four balance sheet characteristics 
shown in columns 1-4 of Table 12 are 0.72, 0.90, 0.40, 0.39, respectively. As might be expected  (given the 
results of Section III, the F statistic on the first stage is large (15.3) and the instruments are statistically 
significant at standard confidence levels; this suggests that the instruments are correlated with the branch 
location decision. Following Angrist and Krueger (2001) and Kelejian (1971) we use a linear model to 
generate first-stage predicted values in order to avoid misspecification.    27
These results are also similar to findings of research analyzing recent changes in the 
banking system following consolidation. Some studies (such as Berger and Hannan 1998; 
Dick 2006; and Deyoung, Hasan, and Kirschoff 1998) find that in the 1990s, banks 
facing less competition were less efficient, and that when competition was introduced, 
efficiency eventually improved. Berger, Dick, Goldberg, and White (2005) find that 
competing with a large multi-market bank boosted small bank profitability in the 1980s, 
but reduced it during the 1990s.
42  
 
V. How did Competition with Branches Affect the Stability of the Banking System?  
 
We have thus far verified that the wave of branch banking that occurred in 
California in the 1920s is broadly similar, in terms of the effects of competition and entry, 
to what researchers have identified for the recent wave of consolidation. We now turn to 
analyzing the long-run effects of bank stability and assessing how competition from a 
branching institution affected the survival of banks following the onset of the Great 
Depression. A priori, the effect of competition on stability is ambiguous. Competition 
could decrease stability by depriving banks of monopoly profits that might support them 
during difficult times.
43 Alternatively, and consistent with the evidence from Section IV, 
the increased efficiency brought about by competition could better enable smaller banks 
to deal with economic difficulties and thereby increase stability. We test these competing 
hypotheses by examining whether the establishment of a branch in the town is associated 
with an increase or decrease in the expected survival time of a bank. Since there were few 
bank failures in California before 1930, we focus on bank failures in the interval from 
June 30, 1929 and March 1, 1933 (prior to the government-mandated bank holiday).  
 
A. Estimating Bank Survivorship during the Great Depression 
 
                                                           
42 Our results are also qualitatively similar to literature on foreign bank penetration into developing country 
banking markets; several studies (Claessens, Demigurc-Kunt, and Huizinga 2001; Claessens and Laeven 
2003; and Sturm and Williams 2002) find that greater foreign bank entry and fewer restrictions on entry are 
associated with more competitive national banking markets. 
43 Further, loans are riskier than many other assets. Thus, if competition prompted banks to increase the 
ratio of loans to other assets, then competition may have increased the risk level of these banks.   28
We test our hypothesis using duration analysis. This framework allows us to 
update our competition variables as they change between 1929 and 1933. We consider 
how time to failure was affected by (1) the presence of a Bank of America branch, (2) the 
presence of other large branch banks, (3) or the presence of small branch banks. We also 
add a variety of balance sheet and location characteristics (including new unit bank entry) 
that previous research has found to affect survival time of banks. The location-specific 
variables include ones that are similar to those used previously as well as the county 
unemployment rate in 1930 (to control for the severity of economic distress at the start of 
the period) and the share of county income from agriculture (1929). Balance sheet 
characteristics and other bank-specific attributes are initial 1929 values. For each non-
branch bank i, we estimate the equation: 
 
(5) Time until failurei = f {β1Branch of the Bank of America in townit +  
β2Branch of other large branch banks in townit + β3Branch of a small bank in townit +  
β4Log assetsi  + β5Loans to assetsi + β6Securities to assetsi  + β7Capital to assetsi +  
β8Surplus to assetsi + β9Excess capital ratioi + β10Excess surplus ratioi + β11Cash to depositsi +  
β12Demand deposits to total depositsi + β12State bank indicatori + β13Log age of banki +  
β15Trust Depti + β16Log city populationi + β17Distance to large cityi +  
β18Distance to large city squaredi + β19Banks per capitait +  
β20One bank in townit + β21New unit bank enters towni + 
β22Share of county income from agriculturei + β22County unemployment ratei}, 
where t indicates that the characteristic changes over time. Failure indicates unit banks 
failing between June 30, 1929 and March 1, 1933. 
  The results shown in Table 15 are consistent with the notion that competition 
increases stability. We find that banks facing competition from the Bank of America had 
an expected survival time about 86 percent longer than banks not facing similar 
competition. For banks that failed, the average time until failure was 632 days, so the 
impact of competing with the Bank of America would seem quite notable. Thus, it 
appears that the benefits of increased efficiency exceeded any loss of monopoly profits or 
risk associated with the changes in balance sheet positions. Somewhat surprisingly, we do 
not find a similar effect from competition from other banks. This may reflect the impact 
of the Bank of America on more banks, as its branching network was larger and had 
greater geographical coverage than those of other banks. We also examined the effects of   29
competing with multiple large banks by replacing the previous branching variables with 
indicators for whether the bank competed with one or more large branching networks. 
Unit banks competing with multiple large branching networks had an expected survival 
time about double that of banks not competing with any large branch bank while those 
competing with a single large branch bank increased their expected survival time by 50 
percent (the coefficients for competing with one large branch network and multiple 
branch networks are not statistically different). These results are also consistent with the 
simple counts of failures displayed in Table 6, which shows more bank failures during 
the Depression in cities lacking one of the large branch banking networks.
44  
We find statistically significant effects on survival for a few other factors included 
in our model. State banks performed worse than national banks (their expected survival 
time was 33 percent shorter), and banks with a larger surplus survived longer.
45 
(Curiously, we find reduced survivability for banks with higher capital-to-asset ratios.) 
As would be predicted, there is also some evidence that banks in areas with more 
unemployment failed sooner. The branching results also appear robust to including 
county-level fixed effects to control for unobserved characteristics that may be driving 
differences in bank failures (Table 16). 
 
B. Accounting for Selection Bias in the Survival Analysis 
 
As was the case with our empirical estimates of the external effect of branch 
competition on balance sheet characteristics, it is possible that the empirical estimates of 
survivorship for unit banks, exposed to competition from branching networks, are 
overstated due to selection bias. That is, branching networks may have chosen to expand 
in cities or towns that were inherently more stable. If this were the case, we would be 
attributing greater survivorship for unit banks during the Great Depression in these areas 
to changes induced by competition rather than the branching network’s ability to enter 
                                                           
44 As one banking analyst writing in 1930 concluded, “It is not meant to imply here that branch banks 
loaned wisely and unit banks unwisely. As in any other economic situation, there were sheep and goats on 
both sides. Yet the sounder policies of branch banks had wider influence and frequently affected the unit 
banks (Ostrolenk, 1930, p.177).”   30
markets in a selective fashion. As we discussed in Section IV, the historical record 
provides suggestive evidence that selection bias may not be a significant problem for 
estimating the effects of branching on bank survivorship during our sample period. 
Nevertheless, since the empirical estimates of the effects of branching on bank failures 
are of fundamental interest, we also provide some econometric evidence. We first report 
on IV regressions for unit bank survivorship and then provide an estimate of the degree 
of selection bias.  
In order to control for selection bias, we instrument for the branching variable 
using a similar set of instruments for the branch location decision as were used in the IV 
regressions shown in Section IV: the town or city’s population in 1922, whether the city 
is a county seat, whether it is city in north of state, distance to a large city, distance to a 
large city (squared), and interactions of distance from a large city and city size. Since 
two-stage duration estimates are inconsistent (Cameron and Trivedi 2005), we rely on IV 
probit regressions to provide suggestive evidence whether our results are sensitive to 
selection bias. The first-stage results are reported in Table 17; branching is defined as one 
large branching network in the town.
46 Because the definition of branching is slightly 
different from what we reported in Tables 15 and 16, Table 18 reports both standard 
probit estimates (first two columns) and the IV probit estimates (last two columns).
47 As 
the first row shows, the coefficient on at least one large branch banking network in the 
town is positive and statistically significant in both the probit and the IV probit models. 
The IV results are thus consistent with our earlier findings: that competition from 
branching networks improved the survivability of unit banks during the Great 
Depression.
48  
                                                                                                                                                                             
45 We also tried including a dummy for whether the bank was a Federal Reserve member; however, there 
were too few state member banks in the sample to get an accurate assessment of the effect of Federal 
Reserve membership. 
46 The F statistic on the first stage is very large (26.2) and the t statistics on the instruments are large, 
suggesting that the instruments are correlated with the branch location decision. To implement the IV 
procedure, we also need to hold the branching competition variable constant at its 1929 value rather than 
updating it as in the preceding analysis. 
47 We use this definition of branching for the IV estimates so that branching is defined in the same way 
when estimating the amount of selection bias. Since the strategy for measuring selection bias is based on a 
single treatment effect (Altonji, Elder, and Taber 2005), this required us to simplify the definition from 
what was used in Tables 14 and 15. 
48 We also considered a Heckman selection model where we estimated a two-stage treatment-effect model 
similar to Maddala (1983). In the first stage, we estimated a logit model examining whether a variety of   31
Because IV estimates depend on both the plausibility (that the instruments affect 
the branch location decision but not bank survivorship) and “power” (that they are not 
“too weak” in an overidentified model), we present an alternative approach for dealing 
with the issue of selection bias. We construct an estimate of the degree of selection bias 
in our baseline regressions following the methodology of Altonji, Elder, and Taber 
(2005). Although we cannot directly observe how much influence unobserved city 
characteristics have on our estimated effect of branching on bank survivability, we can 
conduct the following thought experiment: how much selection on unobservable 
characteristics would be required to eliminate the estimated positive effect that branching 
has on survivability.  
Intuitively, we use the degree of selection on observables to provide information 
about how much selection there is on unobservables. We start by considering the formula 
for omitted variables bias in an OLS equation of the variable of interest (survival) on the 
city observables (X), the predicted value of branching based on observables from a first 
stage regression, and the value of branching not based on the observables (BR*):  
 
(6)  ˆ plim [ ( )/ ( *)][ ( | 1) ( | 0)] Var BR Var BR BR BR α αε ε ≅+ Ε =− Ε =  
 
where α is the effect of the branching variable on the variable of interest, BR is an 
indicator variable for the presence of a branching network in the town, BR* is the part of 
BR that is orthogonal to the observables, and ε is the regression residual. The term 
[Var(BR)/Var(BR*)][E(ε  | BR=1) – E(ε | BR=0)] represents the bias. Under the null 
hypothesis of no effect from branching, the entire estimated “treatment effect” results 
                                                                                                                                                                             
city and county characteristics affected whether any large branch bank network established a branch in the 
town between 1922 and 1929; this is similar to the regression shown in equation (1). Using the coefficients 
from the first stage, we determined a treatment effect, which is related to the latent desirability of the 
municipality as a branch location. We estimated the second stage with this treatment effect. Standard errors 
of this procedure are determined by bootstrapping the entire procedure. In our first stage regression, we 
also include the growth of deposits between 1924 and 1928 (Data on branch deposits by city are from 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit No. 10768 Transamerica Corporation v. Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System 1952.)  Including deposit growth allows us to capture (to some 
extent) whether the growth potential of the city is influenced the branch decision. The results are similar to 
those presented earlier in the paper: competing with either the Bank of America or with multiple large 
branch banks increases the expected survival time; however, the statistical significance for competing with 
a single branch bank is somewhat weaker compared to the results presented in Section V. Results are 
available from the authors upon request.   32
from unobservable characteristics. In the limit, equation (6) also holds when a probit 
regression is used.  In order to determine [E(ε | BR=1) – E(ε | BR=0)] for the probit 
regression, we rely on the following condition: 
 
(7)  ) ' ( / )] 0 | ' ( ) 1 | ' ( [ ) ( / )] 0 | ( ) 1 | ( [ γ γ γ ε ε ε X Var BR X BR X Var BR BR = Ε − = Ε = = Ε − = Ε  
where γ represents the coefficients relating the city observables to the variable of interest. 
Thus we are able to create an upper bound in the bias in a bivariate probit model. The 
ratio  ] / ˆ [ bias α  describes how much larger the selection on unobservables would have to 
be relative to the selection on observables to eliminate the treatment effect.   
To construct the estimated amount of bias described above, we estimate three 
models: (1) a model where branching is included and defined similarly to the IV 
specifications shown in the paper (Y=αBR+γX+ε in the notation above); (2) an 
equivalent model to the first, but where the branching variable is set equal to zero 
(Y=γX+ε in the notation above); and (3) a model similar to that shown in Table 7, where 
branching is the dependent variable and is a function of observables (BR=βX+BR* in the 
notation above). Table 19 shows our computations where the first two regressions are 
specified either as probits or duration models. The first column of Table 19 uses 
regression model (2) and computes the average predicted values subject to the branching 
effect and the average predicted values not subject to branching and normalizes these by 
the variance of the predicted values. Larger values suggest there are more notable 
differences in observables between these two groups. Column 2 shows the variance of the 
errors from the second regression model (and in the case of the probit is defined to be 
equal to 1). Column 3, the product of the first two columns, shows the differences in the 
error terms for the branching and non-branching cities. Column 4 provides the estimate of 
the magnitude of the bias while column 5 is the estimated "treatment effect" – the effect 
of branching from model (1). The last column, labeled implied ratio, shows how large the 
selection problem would have to be in order to reduce the branching effect to zero, and is 
column 5 divided by column 4. As this column indicates, selection on the unobservables 
would have to be either 2.1 or 2.9 times as strong as selection on the observables 
(depending on whether we use the probit or duration model) in order to explain away the 
entire effect that branch-banking has on unit bank failure rates during the Great   33
Depression. As this degree of selection bias seems unlikely, these results suggest that 




This paper has examined the 20th century’s first episode of the development of 
large-scale branch banking networks in the United States and has shown how these 
networks transformed the banking system in California. Because our sample tracks a 
large number of banks over time as they are exposed to increased competition and then to 
a large macroeconomic shock, we are able to provide a thorough assessment of the 
relationship between competition and stability. Our empirical approach enables us to 
show that the unit banks competing with large branch banking networks were the ones 
that became more efficient, and were also subsequently more resistant to the shocks of 
the Great Depression (even when we control for selection bias). 
Similar to the recent wave of bank mergers in the United States, we show that 
consolidation in California in the 1920s occurred as branching networks expanded. 
Moreover, we find evidence of an external effect: remaining banks changed their 
behavior in response to large branching networks in ways that are consistent with 
increased efficiency. These results are similar to what has been found in Syverson (2004) 
and the structural dynamic panel IO literature, which emphasizes how a reduction in 
barriers can breed efficiency. We then find that branching affects stability. Banks 
competing with these large branch banks, especially the Bank of America, were better 
able to survive the Great Depression, likely because they were forced to become more 
efficient. These results provide a coherent story about why U.S. states that allowed 
branching in the 1930s fared better during the Great Depression. In doing so, we show 
that an important benefit of branch banking, and an important reason why states 
permitting it fared better in the 1930s, was that the expansion of branch banking 
unleashes the disciplinary powers of competition. By emphasizing the competitive effects 
of branching (rather than diversification benefits), we are able to reconcile the seemingly 
disparate empirical findings regarding the effects of branching at the aggregate level 
(Mitchener 2005 and Wheelock 1995) and at the bank level (Calomiris and Mason 2003   34
and Carlson 2004). The results allow us to speculate that the removal of branching 
restrictions and the wave of consolidation in the U.S. today may lead to a banking system 
that is more resistant to financial shocks.   35
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Source: Federal Reserve (1931).  
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Figure 2 
Extent of Branching by Bank of America in 1929 
  
Source: Annual Report of the Superintendent of Banks of the State of California (various years), Rand 
McNally (various years), Comptroller of Currency Annual Report and Statements of Conditions (various 
years), and internal records of the Bank of America.  
 
Figure 3 
Extent of Branching by Security-First National Bank in 1929 
 
 
Source: Annual Report of the Superintendent of Banks of the State of CA (various years), Rand McNally 
(various years), Comptroller of Currency Annual Report and Statements of Conditions (various years).    41
Figure 4 
Extent of Branching by American Trust Bank in 1929 
 
 
Source: Annual Report of the Superintendent of Banks of the State of CA (various years), Rand McNally 




Extent of Branching by California Bank in 1929 
 
 
Source: Annual Report of the Superintendent of Banks of the State of CA (various years), Rand McNally 
(various years), Comptroller of Currency Annual Report and Statements of Conditions (various years).    42
Table 1 
Branches in the United States in 1929 
  California  New 
York  Michigan  North 
Carolina 




          
Branches in the bank’s 
home office city  314 662 434  11  872  2293 
Branches outside the 
bank’s home office 
city 
538 0  0  66  452  1056 
Total  branches  852 662 434  77  1324  3349 
 
Notes and sources: New York and Michigan have the most total branches after California.  North Carolina 


















           
Home Office  56  58 34 32 78  258 
Outside   387 79 63 13 53  595 
Total Branches  443 137 97 45 131  853 
 
Notes and sources: Annual Report of the Superintendent of Banks of the State of California (various years), 
Rand McNally (various years), Comptroller of Currency Annual Report and Statements of Conditions 
(various years), and internal records of the Bank of America. The Bank of America had head offices in two 
cities; the nationally chartered Bank of Italy was headquartered in San Francisco and the state-chartered 
Bank of America was headquartered in Los Angeles. 
 
Table 3 
Branches by Size of Municipality for the Four Largest Branching Banks in 1929 
   Bank of America  Security Trust  American Bank  California Bank 
Town Population  Number 
Percent of 
Total  Number 
Percent of 
Total  Number 
Percent of 
Total  Number 
Percent of 
Total 
Under  500  22  5.0 2 1.5 2 2.1 1 2.2 
500-1,000  31  7.0 4 3.0 2 2.1 1 2.2 
1,000-2,500  52  11.8  14  10.4  7 7.4 2 4.4 
2,500-5,000  45  10.2  4 3.0 8 8.4 1 2.2 
5,000-10,000  50 11.4 16 11.9 10 10.5  3  6.7 
10,000-25,000  24  5.5  15  11.2  5 5.3 1 2.2 
25,000-50,000  28  6.4 5 3.7 3 3.2 2 4.4 
50,000-100,000 24  5.5  11  8.2 9 9.5 2 4.4 
100,000+  164  37.3 63 47.0 49 51.6 32 71.1 
            
Total  440  100  134  100 95 100 45 100 
Sources: Annual Report of the Superintendent of Banks of the State of California (various years), Rand 
McNally (various years), Comptroller of Currency Annual Report and Statements of Conditions (various 
years), and internal records of the Bank of America. The four largest branching networks are those shown 
in table 2.    43
Table 4 
Branch Establishment: De Novo versus Merger or Acquisition (M&A) 
 
 
Notes and sources: Large cities are defined a population greater than or equal to 20,000 in 1922. Annual 
Report of the Superintendent of Banks of the State of California (various years), Rand McNally (various 
years), Comptroller of Currency Annual Report and Statements of Conditions (various years), internal 





Distribution of Banks by Town Size (1922) and M&A Activity from 1922 to 1929 
   Banks 
Mergers & 
Acquisitions 





Under 500  59 8.5  26  5.8 
500-1,000  88 12.7  40 8.9 
1,000-2,500  163 23.6 83 18.6 
2,500-5,000  118 17.1 62 13.9 
5,000-10,000  72 10.4  69  15.4 
10,000-25,000  55 8.0  40  8.9 
25,000-50,000  37 5.4  25  5.6 
50,000-100,000  32 4.6  28  6.3 
100,000+  67 9.7  74  16.6 
        
Total  691  100 447 100 
 
Sources: Annual Report of the Superintendent of Banks of the State of California (various years), Rand 
McNally (various years), Comptroller of Currency Annual Report and Statements of Conditions (various 
years), and internal records of the Bank of America, and California State Department of Finance (2004).  
 
  
Los Angeles  San Francisco  Other Large City  Other Small City  California 
Year  De Novo  Merger  De Novo  Merger  De Novo Merger De Novo Merger  De Novo  Merger 
1923  27 2  6  3  16 6 19 29 68 40 
1924  30 2  6  1  10 3 10 21 56 27 
1925  17  3 7  0  2 5 7 32 33 40 
1926  21  4 4  0  6 2 2 14 33 20 
1927  24 6 21  3  21  13  24 59 90 81 
1928  4 2 5  3  10 4 18 22 37 31 
1929  5 5 2  1  2 1 3 12 12 19 
1930  2  0  0 0 0  0  7 6 9 6 
1931  2  0  0 0 3  0  1 1 6 1 
1932  1  1  0 0 0  0  2 0 3 1 
                
Total  133  25 51  11  70 34 93 196 347 266   44
Table 6 
Bank Activity over Time by the Extent of Branching in the City 
 
  No large branching networks  One large branching network  Multiple large branching networks 
year banks new 
banks  mergers failures  banks  new 
banks  mergers failures banks  new 
banks  mergers failures
1922  583  25  41  2  29  7 7 0  110  6 5 0 
1923  530  35 39  1  80 16  7  0 107 7  16  0 
1924  474  12  29  0  98  2 2 0  125  3 6 0 
1925  427  14 36  2 113  10  13  0 134 7  3  0 
1926  384  14 18  2 135  11  13  0 148 8  6  1 
1927  320  11 59  4 115  10  36  0 130 9  33  0 
1928  254  5  32  1  131  5 13 0  130  11  25 0 
1929  218  3  14  2  145  7 9 0  135  6 7 1 
1930  208  3  4  5  144  4 5 1  131  1 7 1 
1931  189  0  5  10  141  0 3 2  129  1 2 3 
1932  171 0  4  14 125  1  4  13 119  0  5  5 
Sources: Annual Report of the Superintendent of Banks of the State of California (various years), Rand 
McNally (various years), Comptroller of Currency Annual Report and Statements of Conditions (various 
years), and internal records of the Bank of America.    45
Table 7 
City and County Characteristics and the Selection of Branch Location 
(Logistic analysis) 
 
Dependent Variable: Whether a bank was acquired and a branch was established in the municipality 
between June 30, 1922 and June 30, 1929 by:   
   Bank of America  Other Large Branching 
Network  Small Branching Network
Constant -56.84      (85.28 )  79.58   (89.89 )  -57.09    ( 148.30  ) 
Town banking institutions 
per capita  0.12 ***  (0.04 )  0.18***  (0.06 )  0.03    ( 0.06  ) 
One institution in town  -1.06 ***  (0.39 )  -0.57   (0.54 )  -0.86 *  ( 0.53  ) 
National bank in town  -0.38    (0.39 )  0.09   (0.57 )  -0.93 *  ( 0.48  ) 
Log town population  1.01 ***  (0.22 )  0.97***  (0.23 )  0.37    ( 0.27  ) 
Distance to a large city  -0.93    (0.80 )  -2.51**  (1.16 )  0.27    ( 1.10  ) 
Distance to a large city 
squared  0.29    (0.30 )  0.92*  (0.47 )  -0.10    ( 0.43  ) 
County seat  0.62    (0.52 )  -0.43   (0.56 )  -1.30 *  ( 0.72  ) 
Share county income from 
agriculture   0.49    (0.85 )  -0.89   (0.90 )  0.54    ( 1.48  ) 
County income per capita  0.06    (0.07 )  0.13   (0.11 )  0.08    ( 0.08  ) 
Share county population 
from immigrants  0.07    (0.04 )  0.06   (0.05 )  -0.07    ( 0.06  ) 
County population growth 
rate (1910-1920)  -0.01 **  (0.00 )  0.00   (0.00 )  0.01 **  ( 0.00  ) 
County in the north of the 
state  0.78 **  (0.40 )  -0.98**  (0.50 )  -0.02    ( 0.46  ) 
                                
Observations 301  314  281 
Events 124  58  40 
Log-likelihood -298.1  -218.7  -209.2 
Likelihood Ratio Chi
2 109.8  81.7  20.8 
Tau-a 0.32  0.21  0.10 
Notes and Sources: Estimated using logistic analysis. Coefficients, β, can be transformed by 100*(exp(β) - 
1) to indicate the percentage change in the expected time until the even occurs for each one-unit increase in 
the independent variable (see footnote 25). The symbols (***), (**), and (*) indicate statistical significance 
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.  Standard errors are in parentheses. Data on mergers as well 
as branch and bank activity are from Annual Report of the Superintendent of Banks of the State of 
California (various years), Rand McNally (various years), Comptroller of Currency Annual Report and 
Statements of Conditions (various years). Banking competition variables are for 1922. City populations are 
from the California State Department of Finance (2004). County-level information is from U.S. Department 
of Commerce (1920). Large city is defined as either San Francisco or Los Angeles, whichever is nearer. 
Large branch bank network refers to Security-First National Bank, American Trust Bank, and California 
Bank. Observations are all cities or towns in California without a branch of the bank group being 
investigated as of June 30, 1922. Hence, bank characteristics of cities are taken as of this date. Other city 
and county characteristics (with the exception of the population growth rate) use 1920 values.   46
Table 8 
Factors Affecting the Desirability of Individual Banks as Acquisition Targets 
(Duration analysis) 
 
Dependent Variable:  Time from June 30, 1922 until the bank is taken over by: 




Log assets t -0.031    (0.128 ) 0.876   (0.555 )  -0.360    (0.266 )
Interest-bearing assets to total assets t -0.017*  (0.009 ) -0.026   (0.047 )  0.041 *** (0.016 )
Capital to assets t -0.034**  (0.014 ) 0.190**  (0.094 )  -0.062 **  (0.026 )
Surplus to assets t -0.008    (0.020 ) 0.690***  (0.213 )  -0.042    (0.045 )
Excess capital ratio t -0.001    (0.003 ) -0.001   (0.014 )  0.006    (0.007 )
Excess surplus ratio t -0.003    (0.003 ) -0.033*  (0.019 )  0.004    (0.007 )
Cash to deposits t -0.004    (0.002 ) 0.045   (0.035 )  0.004    (0.004 )
Demand deposits to total deposits t -0.001    (0.003 ) -0.053***  (0.014 )  0.005    (0.005 )
State bank t -0.309**  (0.130 ) -1.671**  (0.698 )  -0.239    (0.299 )
Log age of bank t 0.112    (0.088 ) 0.013   (0.419 )  -0.076    (0.196 )
Trust t 0.014    (0.303 ) 0.336   (1.888 )  0.805    (0.842 )
Log town population  -0.035   (0.063 ) -0.559**  (0.241 )  -0.008    (0.128 )
One bank in town t 0.118    (0.142 ) 0.911   (0.765 )  0.195    (0.357 )
Banks in town per capita t 0.005    (0.021 ) -0.107**  (0.051 )  -0.035    (0.027 )
Constant 10.89***  (1.69 ) 6.22   (7.24 )  11.21 *** (3.25 )
                              
Observations  488 488  488 
Events  124 51 47 
Log-likelihood -289.1  -216.9  -178.3 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-squared  33.9  53.2  19.0 
 
Notes and Sources: Estimated using survival analysis and employing a log-logistic distribution. 
Coefficients, β, can be transformed by 100*(exp(β) - 1) to indicate the percentage change in the expected 
time until the even occurs for each one-unit increase in the independent variable (see footnote 30). The 
symbols (***), (**), and (*) indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Variables denoted with a subscript t are updated over the sample period 
if they change. Balance sheet and banks characteristics are updated from their 1922 values in 1924 and 
1926. Town characteristics are updated as they change. Data on mergers, branches, bank activity, and 
balance sheet characteristics are from the Annual Report of the Superintendent of Banks of the State of 
California (various years), Rand McNally (various years), Comptroller of Currency Annual Report and 
Statements of Conditions (various years). City populations are from the California State Department of 
Finance (2004). Large branch bank network refers to Security-First National Bank, American Trust Bank, 
and California Bank. Observations are the number of unit banks in existence as of June 30, 1922. Events 
are acquisitions that took place between June 30, 1922 and June 30, 1929.    47
Table 9 
Factors Affecting the Desirability of Individual Banks as Acquisition Targets 
(Duration analysis) 
Dependent Variable:  Time from June 30, 1922 until the bank is taken over by a large branching network: 
   Large Branch Bank 
Log assetst 0.01    (0.08 ) 
Net worth to assetst -1.10    (1.05 ) 
Cash to depositst -0.11    (0.07 ) 
Demand to total depositst 0.03    (0.28 ) 
Return on equityt 0.02**  (0.01 ) 
Net losses on assetst 0.28**  (0.12 ) 
Administrative costs to total expensest 0.05    (0.58 ) 
State bank  -0.04   (0.16 ) 
Log age of bank  0.02   (0.07 ) 
Trust department  -0.10   (0.20 ) 
Log town population  -0.01   (0.05 ) 
One bank in town  1.26   (67 ) 
Banks in town per capita  0.03   (0.03 ) 
Constant 7.9***  (0.94 ) 
            
Observations  188 
Events 42 
Log-likelihood -68.3 
Likelihood Ratio Chi2  16.5 
 
 
Notes and Sources: Estimated using survival analysis and employing a log-normal distribution. 
Coefficients, β, can be transformed by 100*(exp(β) - 1) to indicate the percentage change in the expected 
time until the even occurs for each one-unit increase in the independent variable (see footnote 30). The 
symbols (***), (**), and (*) indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Variables denoted with a subscript t are updated over the sample period 
if they change. Balance sheet, profitability measures, and banks characteristics are updated from their 1922 
values in 1926. Town characteristics are updated as they change. Data on mergers, branches, bank activity, 
and balance sheet characteristics are from the Annual Report of the Superintendent of Banks of the State of 
California (various years), Rand McNally (various years), Comptroller of Currency Annual Report and 
Statements of Conditions (various years). Profit data are from the Treasury and Federal Reserve “Reports of 
Earnings, Expenses, and Dividends.” City populations are from the California State Department of Finance 
(2004). Large branch bank network refers to Security-First National Bank, American Trust Bank, and 
California Bank. Observations are the number of unit banks in existence as of June 30, 1922. Events are 
acquisitions that took place between June 30, 1922 and June 30, 1929.  
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Table 10 
The Effects of Branch-Bank Entry on Rival Bank Behavior 
(Ordinary Least Squares) 
 
Dependent Variable:  Change in balance-sheet characteristics between 1922 and 1929 listed in column 
heading 




Intercept 0.14      ( 0.15  )  0.09   (0.13 )  -0.04   (0.16 )  573.8   (460.1 )
B of A adds a branch  0.04 *  ( 0.02  )  -0.03   (0.02 )  0.04   (0.02 )  -36.4   (70.0 )
Other large branching 
network adds a branch  0.04    ( 0.03  )  -0.06**  (0.03 )  0.01   (0.03 )  10.7   (101.7 )
Small bank adds a 
branch  0.06    ( 0.04  )  -0.01   (0.04 )  0.03   (0.04 )  41.6   (130.3 )
New unit bank enters 
town  0.05 **  ( 0.02  )  -0.05**  (0.02 )  -0.04   (0.03 )  -21.5   (75.0 )
State bank  0.05 ***  ( 0.02  )  0.00   (0.02 )  0.04*  (0.02 )  106.1*  (57.6 )
Log age of bank  -0.03 ***  ( 0.01  )  0.00   (0.01 )  0.01   (0.01 )  -159.7   (31.6 )
One bank in town  -0.02    ( 0.02  )  0.00   (0.02 )  -0.01   (0.02 )  -105.3   (67.1 )
Population growth rate 
1922-1929 (city)  -0.03 **  ( 0.01  )  0.03***  (0.01 )  -0.02*  (0.01 )  26.2   (32.6 )
Distance to large city  -0.05    ( 0.05  )  0.01   (0.04 )  0.09*  (0.05 )  -207.9   (154.5 )
Distance to large city 
squared  0.00    ( 0.02  )  0.01   (0.02 )  -0.04**  (0.02 )  71.4   (62.0 )
Share of county 
income from 
agriculture  
-0.10    ( 0.14  )  -0.04   (0.13 )  -0.14   (0.16 )  28.9   (456.9 )
                                        
Observations 244 244 244 244 
F-Statistic 5.0  3.8  2.3  3.5 
Adjusted R-squared  0.15  0.11  0.06  0.10 
 
Notes and Sources: The symbols (***), (**), and (*) indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent level, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. Data on balance sheets, trust status, and 
branching activity are from the Annual Report of the Superintendent of Banks of the State of California 
(various years) and Comptroller of Currency Annual Report and Statements of Conditions (various years), 
with information on branching activity supplemented using internal records of the Bank of America. Age of 
bank is from Rand McNally (1922). City population is from the California State Department of Finance 
(2004) supplemented by data from Rand-McNally. Income shares are from U.S. Department of Commerce 
(1920). Observations are California unit banks in existence in 1922 and 1929. Large branch banking 
networks refer to those shown in Figures 2-5.Initial characteristics of the unit banks are as of 1922, share of 
county income in agriculture is the 1920 value, and changes in the banking environment in the city 
(including whether there was any unit bank entry between 1922 and 1929) are those that occurred between 
1922 and 1929.   49
Table 11 
The Effects of Multiple Branch Networks on Rival Bank Behavior 
(Ordinary Least Squares) 
 
Dependent Variable:  Change in balance-sheet characteristics between 1922 and 1929 listed in column 
heading 




Intercept 0.13      ( 0.15  )  0.09   (0.13 )  -0.05   ( 0.16  )  560.3   (458.8 )
One large bank 
branching network 
adds a branch 
0.04 *  ( 0.02  )  -0.02   (0.02 )  0.01   ( 0.02  )  -2.7   (70.4 )
More than one large 
branching network 
adds a branch 
0.04    ( 0.03  )  -0.05**  (0.02 )  0.06**  ( 0.03  )  -65.3   (84.8 )
New unit bank enters 
town  0.05 **  ( 0.02  )  -0.05**  (0.02 )  -0.04   ( 0.03  )  -14.2   (74.7 )
State bank  0.05 ***  ( 0.02  )  0.00   (0.02 )  0.04*  ( 0.02  )  106.2*  (57.4 )
Log age of bank  -0.03 ***  ( 0.01  )  -0.01   (0.01 )  0.02   ( 0.01  )  -160.8   (31.6 )
One bank in town  -0.02    ( 0.02  )  0.00   (0.02 )  -0.01   ( 0.02  )  -102.8   (66.7 )
Population growth rate 
1922-1929 (city)  -0.03 **  ( 0.01  )  0.03***  (0.01 )  -0.02*  ( 0.01  )  26.7   (32.5 )
Distance to large city  -0.04    ( 0.05  )  0.00   (0.05 )  0.12**  ( 0.05  )  -227.3   (157.0 )
Distance to large city 
squared  -0.01    ( 0.02  )  0.02   (0.02 )  -0.05**  ( 0.02  )  78.9   (62.8 )
Share of county income 
from agriculture   -0.09    ( 0.14  )  -0.03   (0.13 )  -0.14   ( 0.16  )  48.7   (456.0 )
                                          
Observations 244  244  244 244 
F-Statistic 5.2  4.1  2.7  4.1 
Adjusted R-squared  0.15  0.11  0.07  0.11 
Notes and Sources: The symbols (***), (**), and (*) indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent level, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. Data on balance sheets, trust status, and 
branching activity are from the Annual Report of the Superintendent of Banks of the State of California 
(various years) and Comptroller of Currency Annual Report and Statements of Conditions (various years), 
with information on branching activity supplemented using internal records of the Bank of America. Age of 
bank is from Rand McNally (1922). City population is from the California State Department of Finance 
(2004) supplemented by data from Rand-McNally. Income shares are from U.S. Department of Commerce 
(1920). Observations are California unit banks in existence in 1922 and 1929. Large branch banking 
networks refer to those shown in Figures 2-5.Initial characteristics of the unit banks are as of 1922, share of 
county income in agriculture is the 1920 value, and changes in the banking environment in the city 
(including whether there was any unit bank entry between 1922 and 1929) are those that occurred between 
1922 and 1929. 
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Table 12 
The Effects of Multiple Branch Networks on Rival Bank Behavior 
(Ordinary Least Squares) 
 
Dependent Variable:  Change in profitability measures between 1922 and 1929 listed in column heading 
   Administrative costs to 
total expense  Return on equity  Return on assets 
Intercept -13.13      (13.31 )  11.11   (16.52 )  0.37    ( 1.10  ) 
At least one large 
branching network 
adds a branch 
-2.81 *  (1.67 )  2.19   (2.11 )  0.24 *  ( 0.14  ) 
Log age of bank  1.97    (1.34 ) -2.23   (1.70 )  0.03    ( 0.11  ) 
New unit bank enters 
town  -2.89    (1.98 )  0.72   (2.50 ) -0.17    ( 0.16  ) 
One bank in town  -1.89    (1.84 ) -2.89   (2.38 ) -0.25 *  ( 0.15  ) 
Distance to large city  -3.79    (4.83 )  0.65   (6.04 )  0.07    ( 0.39  ) 
Distance to large city 
squared  0.83    (2.13 ) -1.33   (2.70 ) -0.06    ( 0.17  ) 
Share of county 
income from 
agriculture  
11.85    (12.17 )  -3.56   (14.95 )  -0.65    ( 1.01  ) 
                                 
Observations 120  120 120 
F-Statistic 1.24  1.31  1.73 
Adjusted R-squared  0.03  0.02  0.04 
Notes and Sources: The symbols (***), (**), and (*) indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent level, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. Data on branching activity are from the 
Annual Report of the Superintendent of Banks of the State of California (various years), Comptroller of 
Currency Annual Report and Statements of Conditions (various years), and the internal records of the Bank 
of America. Age of bank is from Rand McNally (1922). Profit data are from the Treasury and Federal 
Reserve “Reports of Earnings, Expenses, and Dividends.” City population is from the California State 
Department of Finance (2004) supplemented by data from Rand-McNally. Income shares are from U.S. 
Department of Commerce (1920). Observations are California unit banks in existence in 1922 and 1929. 
Large branch banking networks refer to those shown in Figures 2-5. Initial characteristics of the unit banks 
are as of 1922, share of county income in agriculture is the 1920 value, and changes in the banking 
environment in the city (including whether there was any unit bank entry between 1922 and 1929) are those 
that occurred between 1922 and 1929.   51
Table 13 
First-Stage Regressions for IV Estimates of Changes in Balance Sheet Characteristics 
(Ordinary Least Squares) 
 
Dependent variable: Variable indicating whether one of the four large branching  
banks adds a branch in the town. 
   First stage regression 
Constant -1.06***  (0.21 ) 
City population (1922)  0.19***  (0.03 ) 
City in the north of the state  0.67**  (0.30 ) 
Interaction of city population and 
north of state  -0.08**  (0.04 ) 
County population (1910)  -0.04*  (0.02 ) 
            
Observations  194 
Adjusted R-squared  0.23 
F-statistic 15.3 
 
Notes and Sources: The symbols (***), (**), and (*) indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent level, respectively.  Standard errors are in parentheses. Data on branch and bank activity are from 
Annual Report of the Superintendent of Banks of the State of California (various years), Rand McNally 
(various years), Comptroller of Currency Annual Report and Statements of Conditions (various years). City 
populations are from the California State Department of Finance (2004). County-level information is from 
U.S. Department of Commerce (1910). Large branch bank network refers to Bank of America, Security-
First National Bank, American Trust Bank, and California Bank.   52
Table 14 
Comparing OLS and Instrumental Variable Estimates for the 
Effects of Branch-Bank Entry on Rival Bank Behavior 
Dependent Variable:  Balance-sheet characteristics listed in column heading 




Intercept 0.13      ( 0.14  )  0.11   (0.13 )  -0.08   (0.16 )  644.1   (463 )
At least one large 
branching network adds a 
branch 
0.07 ***  ( 0.02  )  -0.06***  (0.02 )  0.02   (0.02 )  -23.8   (68.4 )
State bank  0.05 ***  ( 0.02  )  0.00   (0.02 )  0.04**  (0.02 )  102.3*  (57.5 )
Log age of bank  -0.03 ***  ( 0.01  )  0.00   (0.01 )  0.01   (0.01 )  -161.8*** (31.6 )
One bank in town  -0.01    ( 0.02  )  -0.02   (0.02 )  -0.01   (0.02 )  -112.2*  (68.0 )
New unit bank enters town  0.06 **  ( 0.02  )  -0.07***  (0.02 )  -0.02   (0.03 )  -62.2   (78.2 )
Population growth rate 
1922-1929 (city)  -0.03 ***  ( 0.01  )  0.03***  (0.01 )  -0.02*  (0.01 )  28.2   (32.6 )
Distance to large city  -0.05    ( 0.05  )  0.01   (0.04 )  0.11**  (0.05 )  -226.4   (152.8 )
Distance to large city 
squared  0.00    ( 0.02  )  0.01   (0.02 )  -0.05**  (0.02 )  77.4   (61.8 )
Share county income from 
agriculture   -0.10    ( 0.14  )  -0.05   (0.13 )  -0.11   (0.16 )  -17.6   (457 )
                                         
Observations 242  242  242  242 
F-statistic 6.5  4.8  2.4  4.3 
R-squared 0.17  0.12  0.05  0.11 
Instrumental Variables 




Intercept -0.01    (  0.83 ) 0.22 ( 0.66 ) -0.12 ( 0.26  )  623 ( 464 )
At least one large 
branching network adds a 
branch 
0.17 **  ( 0.06 ) -0.13 *** ( 0.04 ) 0.03 ( 0.06  )  83 ( 101 )
State bank  0.05  ***  (  0.01 ) 0.00 ( 0.01 ) 0.04 ( 0.05  )  103 ( 132 )
Log age of bank  -0.03    (  0.03 ) 0.00 ( 0.02 ) 0.02 ( 0.01  )  -167 ( 137 )
One bank in town  0.00    (  0.06 ) -0.02 ( 0.05 ) -0.01 ( 0.03  )  -81 ( 146 )
New unit bank enters town  0.01    (  0.03 ) -0.03 ( 0.03 ) -0.03 ( 0.04  )  -89 ( 97 )
Population growth rate 
1922-1929 (city)  -0.01   (  0.02 ) 0.02 ( 0.01 ) -0.02 * ( 0.01  )  32 ( 25 )
Distance to large city  -0.02    (  0.04 ) -0.01 ( 0.07 ) 0.12 ( 0.09  )  -224 * ( 118 )
Distance to large city 
squared  -0.01   (  0.01 ) 0.02 ( 0.03 ) -0.05 ( 0.04  )  76 * ( 44 )
Share county income from 
agriculture   -0.01   (  0.80 ) -0.12 ( 0.67 ) -0.08 ( 0.26  )  -35 ( 452 )
                                           
Bootstrap Repetitions  500  500  500  500 
Notes and Sources: The symbols (***), (**), and (*) indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent level, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. Data on balance sheets, trust status, and 
branching activity are from the Annual Report of the Superintendent of Banks of the State of California 
(various years) and Comptroller of Currency Annual Report and Statements of Conditions (various years), 
with information on branching activity supplemented using internal records of the Bank of America. Age of 
bank is from Rand McNally (1922). City population is from the California State Department of Finance 
(2004) supplemented by data from Rand-McNally. Income shares are from U.S. Department of Commerce 
(1920). Observations are California unit banks in existence in 1922 and 1929.    53
Table 15 
The Effect of Branch Banks on Bank Failures, 1929-33 
(Duration Analysis) 
   
Dependent variable: Time from June 30, 1929 until failure 
   By branch bank group  By number of branch 
banks 
Bank of America in city t 0.62**  (0.25 )             
Other large branching network in city t 0.05    (0.26 )             
Small branching network in city t -0.03    (0.28 )             
Branch of one large network t        0.43*  ( 0.25  ) 
Branch of multiple large networks t        0.71*  ( 0.41  ) 
Log assets  -0.32*  (0.20 )  -0.26   ( 0.20  ) 
Loans to assets  -0.02   (0.02 )  -0.02   ( 0.02  ) 
Securities to assets  -0.03   (0.02 )  -0.03   ( 0.02  ) 
Capital to assets  -0.06**  (0.03 )  -0.05**  ( 0.03  ) 
Surplus to assets  0.10**  (0.04 )  0.09**  ( 0.04  ) 
Excess capital  0.72*  (0.43 )  0.66   ( 0.43  ) 
Excess surplus  0.36   (0.24 )  0.36   ( 0.26  ) 
Cash to deposits  -0.02   (0.02 )  -0.02   ( 0.02  ) 
Demand to total deposits  0.00   (0.00 )  0.00   ( 0.00  ) 
State bank  -0.41**  (0.19 )  -0.39**  ( 0.19  ) 
Log age of bank  -0.06   (0.12 )  -0.05   ( 0.12  ) 
Trust department  0.11   (0.59 )  0.04   ( 0.60  ) 
New unit bank enters town t 0.26    (0.22 )  0.19   ( 0.22  ) 
Log city population  -0.08   (0.09 )  -0.08   ( 0.08  ) 
Distance to large city  0.73   (0.50 )  0.86*  ( 0.50  ) 
Distance to large city squared  -0.26   (0.19 )  -0.32*  ( 0.19  ) 
Banks per capita t -0.01    (0.05 )  -0.01   ( 0.05  ) 
One bank in town t -0.17    (0.20 )  -0.21   ( 0.20  ) 
Agricultural income share  -0.19   (0.20 )  -0.16   ( 0.20  ) 
Unemployment rate  -0.08*  (0.05 )  -0.09*  ( 0.05  ) 
Constant 34.75*  (20.4 ) 30.92   ( 20.1  ) 
 
Observations 292  292 
Failures 60  60 
Log Likelihood  -148.1  -149.6 
Notes and Sources: Estimated using survival analysis and employing a log-logistic distribution. 
Coefficients, β, can be transformed by 100*(exp(β) - 1) to indicate the percentage change in the expected 
time until the even occurs for each one-unit increase in the independent variable.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  The symbols (***), (**), and (*) indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
level, respectively.  Data on balance sheets, trust status, and branching activity are from the Annual Report 
of the Superintendent of Banks of the State of California (various years) and Comptroller of Currency 
Annual Report and Statements of Conditions (various years), with information on branching activity 
supplemented using internal records of the Bank of America. Age of bank is from Rand McNally (1922). 
1929 city populations are from the California State Department of Finance (2004) supplemented by data 
from Rand McNally’s. The unemployment rate in 1930 and other county-level characteristics (1929 values) 
are from U.S. Department of Commerce (1930). Observations are the number of banks in existence as of 
June 30, 1929. Failures indicate banks failing between June 30, 1929 and March 1, 1933. Balance sheet and 




Robustness Check for the Effect of Branch Banks on Bank Failures, 1929-33 
   
Dependent variable: Time from June 30, 1929 until failure 
   By branch bank  By number of branch banks 
Bank of America in city t 0.65**  (0.28 )             
Other large branching network in city t 0.06    (0.28 )             
Small branching network in city t 0.22    (0.33 )             
Branch of one large network t        0.44    ( 0.28  ) 
Branch of multiple large networks t        0.72 *  ( 0.43  ) 
Log assets  -0.53**  (0.23 )  -0.45 **  ( 0.23  ) 
Loans to assets  -0.01   (0.02 )  -0.02    ( 0.03  ) 
Securities to assets  -0.03   (0.02 )  -0.03    ( 0.02  ) 
Capital to assets  -0.07**  (0.03 )  -0.06 **  ( 0.03  ) 
Surplus to assets  0.11**  (0.05 )  0.10 **  ( 0.05  ) 
Excess capital  0.94*  (0.49 )  0.84 *  ( 0.49  ) 
Excess surplus  0.36*  (0.20 )  0.36 *  ( 0.22  ) 
Cash to deposits  -0.02   (0.02 )  -0.02    ( 0.02  ) 
Demand to total deposits  0.00   (0.00 )  0.00    ( 0.00  ) 
State Bank  -0.54**  (0.22 )  -0.51 **  ( 0.22  ) 
Log age of bank  -0.05   (0.13 )  -0.03    ( 0.14  ) 
Trust department  0.08   (0.68 )  0.04    ( 0.69  ) 
New unit bank enters town t 0.31    (0.26 )  0.24    ( 0.25  ) 
Log city population   -0.11   (0.10 )  -0.08    ( 0.09  ) 
Distance to large city  0.23   (1.21 )  0.35    ( 1.23  ) 
Distance to large city squared  -0.18   (0.43 )  -0.20    ( 0.44  ) 
Banks per capita t -0.02    (0.05 )  -0.01    ( 0.05  ) 
One bank in town t -0.30    (0.23 )  -0.38    ( 0.23  ) 
                  
County fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
Observations 293  293 
Failures 60  60 
Log Likelihood  -126.6  -128.4 
 
Notes and Sources: Estimated using survival analysis and employing a log-logistic distribution. 
Coefficients, β, can be transformed by 100*(exp(β) - 1) to indicate the percentage change in the expected 
time until the even occurs for each one-unit increase in the independent variable.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  The symbols (***), (**), and (*) indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
level, respectively.  Data on balance sheets, trust status, and branching activity are from the Annual Report 
of the Superintendent of Banks of the State of California (various years) and Comptroller of Currency 
Annual Report and Statements of Conditions (various years), with information on branching activity 
supplemented using internal records of the Bank of America. Age of bank is from Rand McNally (1922). 
1929 city populations are from the California State Department of Finance (2004) supplemented by data 
from Rand McNally’s. The unemployment rate in 1930 and other county-level characteristics (1929 values) 
are from U.S. Department of Commerce (1930). Observations are the number of banks in existence as of 
June 30, 1929. Failures indicate banks failing between June 30, 1929 and March 1, 1933. Balance sheet and 
other bank characteristics are held at their 1929 values.    55
 Table 17 
First-Stage Regressions for IV Estimates of Bank Failures 
(Ordinary Least Squares) 
 
Dependent variable: Variable indicating whether one of the four large branching  
banks has a branch in the town. 
 
   First stage regression 
Constant -0.62**  (0.26 ) 
Log city population (1922)  0.13***  (0.03 ) 
City in the north of the state  0.11**  (0.05 ) 
Distance to a large city  -1.54**  (0.63 ) 
Distance to a large city squared  0.67**  (0.29 ) 
Interaction of city population and 
distance  0.23***  (0.09 ) 
Interaction of city population and 
distance squared  -0.1**  (0.04 ) 
City is a county seat  0.1   (0.09 ) 
            
Observations  214 
Adjusted R2  0.45 
F-statistic 26.2 
 
Notes and Sources: The symbols (***), (**), and (*) indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent level, respectively.  Standard errors are in parentheses. Data on branch and bank activity are from 
Annual Report of the Superintendent of Banks of the State of California (various years), Rand McNally 
(various years), Comptroller of Currency Annual Report and Statements of Conditions (various years). City 
populations are from the California State Department of Finance (2004). County-level information is from 
U.S. Department of Commerce (1920). Large city is defined as either San Francisco or Los Angeles, 
whichever is nearer. Large branch bank network refers to Bank of America, Security-First National Bank, 
American Trust Bank, and California Bank.   56
Table 18 
Comparing Probit and Instrumental Variables Probit Estimates 
 for the Effects of Branch Banks on Bank Failures (1929-33) 
 
 (Probit Analysis, standard errors for the second stage are from bootstrapped results) 
   
   Probit Estimate  IV Probit Estimate 
Branch of at least one large bank  0.51*  (0.30 )  1.82**  ( 0.86  ) 
New unit banks to bank enters town  0.27   (0.27 )  0.33   ( 0.32  ) 
Log assets  -0.21   (0.23 )  -0.30   ( 0.28  ) 
Loans to assets  -0.04   (0.03 )  -0.03   ( 0.04  ) 
Securities to assets  -0.05   (0.03 )  -0.04   ( 0.04  ) 
Capital to assets  -0.03   (0.03 )  -0.05   ( 0.05  ) 
Surplus to assets  0.09*  (0.06 )  0.11   ( 0.09  ) 
Excess capital to total capital  0.66   (0.56 )  1.01   ( 0.72  ) 
Excess surplus to total surplus  0.63   (0.59 )  0.30   ( 0.72  ) 
Cash to deposits  -0.03   (0.02 )  -0.02   ( 0.04  ) 
Demand to total deposits  0.00   (0.01 )  0.00   ( 0.01  ) 
State bank  -0.57**  (0.24 )  -0.65**  ( 0.29  ) 
Log age of bank  -0.08   (0.15 )  -0.10   ( 0.17  ) 
Trust 0.44    (0.71 )  0.62   ( 2.15  ) 
Log city population (1929)  0.00   (0.08 )  -0.20   ( 0.19  ) 
Distance to large city  1.05*  (0.63 )  0.63   ( 0.89  ) 
Distance to large city squared  -0.42*  (0.25 )  -0.24   ( 0.36  ) 
Agricultural income share  -0.26   (0.24 )  -0.29   ( 0.26  ) 
Unemployment rate  -0.15**  (0.06 )  -0.16*  ( 0.09  ) 
Constant 33.53    (24.89 )  38.44   ( 27.65  ) 
Failures  60 60 
Observations  292             
Log Likelihood  -124.1             
Bootstrap Repetitions     500 
Notes and Sources: The symbols (***), (**), and (*) indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent level, respectively.  Data on balance sheets, trust status, and branching activity are from the Annual 
Report of the Superintendent of Banks of the State of California (various years) and Comptroller of 
Currency Annual Report and Statements of Conditions (various years), with information on branching 
activity supplemented using internal records of the Bank of America. Age of bank is from Rand McNally 
(1922). 1929 city populations are from the California State Department of Finance (2004) supplemented by 
data from Rand McNally’s. The unemployment rate in 1930 and other county-level characteristics (1929 
values) are from U.S. Department of Commerce (1930). Observations are the number of banks in existence 
as of June 30, 1929. Failures indicate banks failing between June 30, 1929 and March 1, 1933. Balance 
sheet and other bank characteristics are held at their 1929 values.   57
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0.08 1.87  0.14 0.31  0.65  2.10 
 
Note: Computations are based on the methodology reported in Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005). The last 
column of the table reports how large the selection on unobservables relative to observables would 
hypothetically have to be in order to reduce the branching effect to zero. See the text for further discussion 
of this table.  58
Appendix Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
 Average across banks  Summary Characteristics 
1922 balance sheets  N Mean   S.E.    
Log assets  506  13.53  (1.20 ) 
Interest-earning assets to total assets (percent)  506  81.01  (9.83 ) 
Capital to assets (percent)  506  11.43  (8.17 ) 
Surplus to assets (percent)  506  4.84  (3.43 ) 
Excess capital to total capital (percent)  506  35.67  (31.35 ) 
Excess surplus to total surplus (percent)  506  56.49  (35.92 ) 
Cash to total deposits (percent)  506  15.71  (11.71 ) 
Demand to demand plus total deposits (percent)  505  64.47  (22.51 ) 
Log age  506  2.31  (1.08 ) 
            
Return on assets (1921)  278  0.54  (0.66 ) 
Return on equity (1921)  280  7.47  (7.74 ) 
Net losses to assets (1921)  281  0.31  (0.48 ) 
Administrative costs to total expenses (1921)  279  39.80  (11.16 ) 
             
1929 balance sheets  N Mean   S.E.    
Log assets  351  13.77  (1.19 ) 
Interest-earning assets to total assets (percent)  351  81.82  (6.91 ) 
Capital to assets (percent)  351  9.40  (4.90 ) 
Surplus to assets (percent)  351  4.48  (3.11 ) 
Excess capital to total capital (percent)  351  33.05  (30.87 ) 
Excess surplus to total surplus (percent)  351  55.94  (35.78 ) 
Cash to total deposits (percent)  351  20.21  (8.34 ) 
Demand to demand plus total deposits (percent)  351  55.12  (19.20 ) 
Log age  351  2.50  (1.00 ) 
            
Return on assets  180  0.39  (0.83 ) 
Return on equity  180  6.24  (11.47 ) 
Net losses to assets  180  0.41  (0.70 ) 
Administrative costs to total expenses  184  39.47  (9.06 )   59
 
Appendix Table 1 (continued). Summary Statistics  
 
 
Average across cities  Summary Characteristics 
1922 values  N Mean     S.E.    
Banking entities per 1000 city residents  391  2.02  ( 3.71  ) 
One bank in city  396  0.44  ( 0.50  ) 
National bank in city  396  0.55  ( 0.50  ) 
Log city population  391  7.23  ( 1.37  ) 
Share county income from agriculture (1920)  393  0.99  ( 0.03  ) 
Income per county population (1920)  393  289  ( 242  ) 
Percent change in county population 1910-1920  393  49.08  ( 41.13  ) 
             
1929 values  N Mean     S.E.    
Banking entities per 1000 city residents  413  1.52  ( 2.01  ) 
One bank in city  424  0.40  ( 0.49  ) 
National bank in city  424  0.37  ( 0.48  ) 
Log city population  413  7.47  ( 1.47  ) 
Share county income from agriculture (1930)  422  0.98  ( 0.04  ) 
Income per county population (1930)  422  172  ( 154  ) 
Percent change in county population (1920-1930)  422  59.91  ( 43.47  ) 
 
Sources: Data on branch and bank activity are from Annual Report of the Superintendent of Banks of the 
State of California (various years), Rand McNally (various years), Comptroller of Currency Annual Report 
and Statements of Conditions (various years). City populations are from the California State Department of 
Finance (2004). County-level information is from U.S. Department of Commerce (1920 and 1930).  
 
 